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Thirty years ago, Congress ushered in a new and miraculous era in
medicine with the creation of the Hatch-Waxman system for approval of generic
drugs. The progress, however, has not been without resistance. This Article
presents an overview of three generations of games pharmaceutical companies
play to keep generics off the market and maintain monopoly pricing. In “Gener-
ation 1.0,” branded companies simply pay generics to delay entering the market,
reaping billions of dollars of benefit. “Generation 2.0” involves paying for delay
through multiple side deals that camouflage the value of the payment. Genera-
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tion 2.0 also includes what this Article refers to as “boy scout clauses”—agree-
ments to behave honorably that actually mask anticompetitive collusion. The
newest generation, however, moves from collusion to obstruction. Generation
3.0 uses administrative processes, regulatory schemes, and drug modifications
to prevent generics from getting to market. Some of these schemes have now
made the news as debates rage over pharmaceutical pricing.
Society, however, cannot necessarily blame companies for engaging in be-
havior that is strongly in their economic self-interest. One cannot expect mice to
run in the appropriate direction if the cheese is located at the other end. Thus,
this Article’s goals are two-fold: first, to shine light on the complex behaviors as
they are unfolding, and second, to explore the contours of how new approaches
could be structured. To paraphrase one former FDA commissioner, we do not
want the most creative activity at pharmaceutical companies to take place in the
legal department. And after thirty years of experience with Hatch-Waxman, it is
time for the next phase.
I. INTRODUCTION: HATCH-WAXMAN FACES THE HATCHET
In most pharmaceutical transactions, patients seamlessly realize the
benefits of generic drugs. A doctor’s written prescription for Pfizer’s Zoloft
is substituted for a generic bottle of sertraline by the time the patient reaches
the pharmacy. Patients who present with standard sinus infections will prob-
ably leave their neighborhood drug store with the classic five-day boxes of
azithromycin for $10,1 rather than boxes actually branded as a Zithromax Z-
Pak. Automatic substitution is led by the pharmacist, who is generally per-
mitted to substitute a generic for a branded drug when available, and the
public enjoys billions of dollars of savings with no action required on the
part of either patients or doctors.2 The patient’s incentives are also usually
aligned with those of insurers and other payors, who wish to pay less when-
ever possible and thus heavily promote the use of generics.
Today, 88% of all prescriptions in the U.S. are filled using generic med-
ication,3 and 81% of all small-molecule drugs have a generic equivalent.4
When a generic is introduced into a market previously monopolized by a
brand-name drug, the generic drug normally enters at a 20% discount from
1 See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINE USE AND SHIFTING COSTS OF
HEALTHCARE: A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2013, at 15
(Apr. 2014), http://www.imshealth.com/en/thought-leadership/ims-institute/reports/use-of-
medicines-in-the-us-2013#ims-form [https://perma.cc/2QX9-AS8V] (“The average co-pay for
78.6% of all retail dispensed prescriptions was $10 or less.”).
2 See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010). Automatic sub-
stitution laws, known as state drug product selection (“DPS”) laws, exist in all fifty states. In
some states, automatic substitution is required when the generic equivalent is available.
3 See Implementation of the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012 (GDUFA):
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 1 & chart.1 (2016)
(statement of Janet Woodcock, Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Res., U.S. Food & Drug
Admin.); see also IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 1, at 51. R
4 See Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Com-
petition in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation
4, 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16431, 2010), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w16431.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YPB-KQBF].
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the branded medication within six months of launch, and the price falls
quickly from that point.5 Eventually, most generics are priced at an 80% to
85% discount from their name-brand equivalents.6 Prices can even fall to
10% of the original cost when many generics enter the market.7 Within a
year of generic introduction, the name-brand drug generally loses an average
of 80% to 90% of its market share.8 The FDA estimates that consumers
saved over $217 billion in 2012 alone through the use of generics,9 with total
savings of $1.68 trillion from 2005 to 2014.10
The introduction of generic competitors is tough on a brand-name drug
company, which must face the loss of its monopoly status and the resulting
severe drop in price. Nevertheless, the design of the patent system dictates
that a patent holder’s right to exclude others from the market must end with
the expiration of the patent.
One might call the generic revolution a miracle, but it certainly did not
occur naturally or serendipitously. The underlying mechanism behind it is
particularly complex. Generic drug entry is covered by the Drug Price Com-
petition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act.11 Passed in 1984, Hatch-Waxman created a pathway to generic
entry meant to incentivize the speedy introduction of generic drugs to mar-
ket. Before the Act, generic entry into the market was slow.12 Would-be ge-
neric manufacturers could not apply to enter the market until after the
branded company’s patents had expired, with the effect that brand-name
companies enjoyed a de facto patent extension and ongoing monopoly prof-
its as the generic awaited FDA approval.13 Further, few generics were enter-
ing the market to begin with. The burden of the application process (which
5 See id. at 9–10, 10 fig.2.
6 See Facts About Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm
167991.htm [http://perma.cc/GQ92-QEN4] (last updated June 19, 2015).
7 See Berndt & Aitken, supra note 4, at 9, 10 fig.2. R
8 See id.; see also Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2157, 2163
exhibit 4 (2011). In fact, for the period between 2004 and 2008, Grabowski et al. found that
the average drug with more than $1 billion in annual sales had more than ten generic competi-
tors one year after first generic entry. See id. at 2160 exhibit 1.
9 GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (2013), http://www
.gphaonline.org/media/cms/2013_Savings_Study_12.19.2013_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/
2EW2-6W6F] (data supplied by IMS Health).
10 Implementation of the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012 (GDUFA): Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement of Janet
Woodcock, Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Res., U.S. Food & Drug Admin.).
11 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
12 See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., REPORT R41114, THE
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER, at Summary (2011), http://congres-
sional.proquest.com/profiles/gis/result/pqpresultpage.gispdfhitspanel.pdflink/$2fapp-bin$2f
gis-congresearch$2ff$2fa$2f7$2f8$2fcrs-2011-rsi-0151_from_1_to_20.pdf/entitlementkeys=
1234%7Capp-gis%7Ccongresearch%7Ccrs-2011-rsi-0151 [http://perma.cc/M2MP-F7KQ].
13 ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 159 (2012).
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required the generic to complete its own clinical trials) and the lack of sub-
stantial profits deterred most manufacturers.14
As discussed in more detail in Part II, Hatch-Waxman offers generics a
number of incentives to enter the market as quickly as possible. First, phar-
maceutical firms can submit an abbreviated new drug application
(“ANDA”) before the patents for the brand-name drug have expired.15
ANDAs only need to contain evidence that the generic is bioequivalent and
has the same pharmacokinetic profile as the brand-name drug; they can rely
on the brand-name drug company’s clinical trial data to meet the rest of the
application requirements, including those related to the safety and efficacy
of the drug.16 Second, in what is known as a Paragraph IV certification, a
generic manufacturer can attempt to enter the market before the pioneer’s
patent term(s) have expired, generally triggering litigation from the branded
firm.17 As a reward for facing the costs and risks of litigation, the first ge-
neric manufacturer to file a Paragraph IV ANDA and gain approval gener-
ally is entitled to 180 days of market exclusivity alongside the brand-name
drug.18 In other words, during the 180-day period, only the brand-name drug
and the first generic filer are allowed to be on the market. While only six
months long, this duopoly period can be extremely valuable, worth hundreds
of millions of dollars for blockbuster drugs.19 This benefit is intended to give
generic companies an incentive to challenge weak patents or patents that
should not cover the drug at issue.
The Hatch-Waxman Act has overwhelmingly met Congress’ goals of
balancing adequate patent protection for pioneer inventors with promoting
the rapid introduction of generics once this patent protection has expired.
Since 1984, more than 10,000 generics have entered the market,20 and the
percentage of prescriptions filled with generics has risen from just 13% in
198021 to around 86% by 2013.22 Most important, generic manufacturers
have the incentive and ability to enter the market immediately after (or even
before) the original patent terms expire.
14 See Elizabeth S. Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 585–90 (2003) (discussing the absence of
generics on the market before the adoption of Hatch-Waxman).
15 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
16 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(v) (2012).
17 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
18 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). Exceptions and stipulations will be discussed in
Part II.
19 See Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 178 & 178
nn.55–56 (2008).
20 See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 12, at 5; see also Medicare Prescription Drug, R
Improvement, and Modernization Act: Hearing on H.R. 1 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm [https://perma.cc/3TP7-BEZY].
21 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AF-
FECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 37 (1998).
22 IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 1, at 51. R
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The actual miracle, however, is not the dramatic rise of generics.
Rather, the miracle is that the benefits of Hatch-Waxman have largely held
up despite its complexity and the persistent attempts at undercutting its aims.
Hatch-Waxman has created a veritable playground of opportunities that
pharmaceutical companies have used to hold off generic competition. This is
understandable. The temptation to avoid the impact of Hatch-Waxman can
be overpowering when even a few months of additional monopoly profits
can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars or more.23 This encourages
companies to expend tremendous energy blocking generic entry by any
means possible, with some companies using ever more clever and compli-
cated strategies. As a result, many pharmaceutical firms may no longer com-
pete solely on the basis of innovation, but rather on their ability to
manipulate policy mechanisms and pathways to extend monopoly and duop-
oly terms.
This behavior undermines the goals of the patent system and can pro-
vide less than optimal innovation effects. One cannot fully blame compa-
nies, however, for engaging in behavior that is strongly in their economic
self-interests. If society wishes its interests to prevail, then the legal system
must bring the incentives of the players into proper alignment with the goals
of society—either by creating sufficient incentives or sufficient disincen-
tives. One cannot expect the rats in the maze to run in the direction society
wishes if the cheese is located at the other end. And, as the system currently
operates, the cheese is poorly located.
The goal of this paper is two-fold: first, to shine light on complex be-
haviors as they are unfolding and, second, to suggest ways to cabin those
behaviors and create incentives for companies to follow the path that is opti-
mal for society. Pharmaceutical companies should be directing their creative
energies toward research and development, not toward inventing new legal
challenges and regulatory obstructions.
To be clear, when pharmaceutical companies preserve their hard-earned
patent exclusivity by legally knocking down generic challenges, such behav-
ior is consistent with societal goals and important for the patent system.
Rights are worth little if the rights-holder cannot enforce them, and that is as
true for patents as for any form of legal right. In contrast, when firms at-
tempt to unlawfully extend their monopolies, such behavior undercuts the
goals of the patent system, and the cost to society can be troubling. Patients
and the general public lose, giving up billions of dollars in savings while
23 For example, Gilead’s Hepatitis C drug, Sovaldi, earned $7.9 billion in sales in 2014,
making it the top-earning drug in the United States. Three additional months of sales at that
rate would be worth $1.98 billion. Pfizer’s Nexium took in $5.9 billion in revenue in the same
year—three additional months would be worth $1.48 billion. Lacie Glover, Here Are the Top-
Selling Drugs in the US, TIME (June 26, 2015), http://time.com/money/3938166/top-selling-
drugs-sovaldi-abilify-humira/?xid=soc_socialflow_twitter_money [http://perma.cc/5K4R-
SLM2]. Fifty-five drugs earned more than $1 billion in revenue in 2013. U.S. Pharmaceutical
Sales—2013, DRUGS, http://www.drugs.com/stats/top100/2013/sales [https://perma.cc/3Q4Z-
TVZT] (last updated Feb. 2014).
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ready-to-market generics languish on the sidelines. The energy spent on ma-
nipulation of the legal system diverts time and resources away from innova-
tion activities.
This Article presents a broad overview of the “games” pharmaceutical
companies play to keep valuable generics away from consumers while en-
riching their own profits. Some basic “pay-for-delay” strategies have ex-
isted since the inception of Hatch-Waxman, but recent judicial scrutiny has
driven firms to undertake micro-level delay strategies with a lower chance of
success and less lucrative returns. Despite the decreased gains that remain
from delay tactics, however, any delay remains valuable. In addition, while
early tactics benefitted both pioneer and generic manufacturers, new ap-
proaches focus on the active obstruction of generic entry by branded firms,
somewhat like tripping other kids on their way to the playground. These
new, combative strategies make up the focus of this Article.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part II explains the Hatch-Waxman
Act pathway to generic entry in more detail, discussing the economic forces
of the pharmaceutical market and amendments designed to improve the
functioning of the Act. Part III discusses the origins of generic delay tactics,
called “Generation 1.0”—the first of three “generations” the Article uses to
categorize the tactics that have evolved over time. The organizational system
of generations is not meant to suggest that these each of these periods has
taken place sequentially and separately. Some “Generation 1.0”-style settle-
ments still survive; early “Generation 3.0” tactics have plagued generics for
more than a decade—the overlap between generations can be substantial.
Instead, the system serves as a helpful way of organizing sets of related
tactics, and the use of “generations” implies that each era of tactics has
evolved from or developed in response to strategies from previous
generations.
In Generation 1.0, delay generally takes the form of “pay-for-delay”
settlements, in which a potential generic manufacturer is simply paid by the
pioneer drug maker to refrain from entering the market until a stipulated
date. These settlements were commonplace for many years, but the Supreme
Court’s 2013 ruling in FTC v. Actavis opened the door to antitrust scrutiny of
such agreements. As described below, a recent state court decision and a
large FTC settlement may signal the end of basic pay-for-delay.
Part IV details the rise of a new generation of pay-for-delay tactics—
“Generation 2.0.” Beginning long before Actavis, these strategies generally
involve the transfer of benefits from the branded firm to a generic manufac-
turer, but not through a simple cash settlement. Generation 2.0 agreements
include patterns of multiple side deals, where two companies settle a number
of Hatch-Waxman disputes at once, resulting in a net benefit for the generic
firm but without any large, conspicuous payment. Other instruments include
overvalued agreements wherein the generic delays entry, but it is paid hand-
somely to promote, manufacture, or otherwise assist the brand-name com-
pany with the sale of its drug. Finally, Generation 2.0 includes “boy scout
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clauses”—agreements to behave honorably that actually mask anticompeti-
tive collusion. As described in Part IV, these side deals are now themselves
facing antitrust scrutiny in the courts.
Part V provides a comprehensive look at emerging “Generation 3.0”
strategies—tactics that, so far, have been deployed largely under the radar.
By detailing this new generation of difficult-to-detect behaviors, the hope is
that policymakers and academics can develop appropriate responses to the
entire panoply of Hatch-Waxman manipulation. Generation 3.0 tactics no
longer focus on delay agreements with generic competitors, but rather on
using administrative processes, regulatory schemes with connections to
Hatch-Waxman, and drug modifications to obstruct generics from getting to
market. Many of these strategies have little justification beyond obstruction
of generics, and some recent fact patterns are falling further outside the
boundaries of common sense. Specifically, Part V will discuss delay mecha-
nisms including labeling changes, using FDA safety restrictions as an excuse
for delay, and sham litigation, as well as “multiplicity tactics,” in which a
number of these mechanisms are exploited at once. Some of these strategies
have been part of recent schemes to restrict generic substitution while simul-
taneously raising prices of the brand-name drug, leading to a swell of public
outrage in fall 2015 and the return of pharmaceuticals as a key policy topic.
Of course, once companies develop new obstacle strategies, they can
also be bargained away, and we are beginning to see new settlement agree-
ments to that effect. Once again, the brand-name drug company can play the
“boy scout,” agreeing to behave well but doing it in a way that colludes with
the first generic filer against other generics that might lower the price for
consumers.
Part VI concludes with ideas for reforming the generic entry pathway.
These ideas borrow from systems theory—looking from the perspective of
how different systems interact to create opportunities and incentives to cor-
rect suboptimal behaviors. Moreover, to move the system away from hide-
and-seek games, this section proposes the addition of standards-based legal
rules. Most important, to avoid “death by tinkering”24—that is, adjusting
doctrines a little here and a little there without comprehensive logic until the
entire area collapses under its own weight—this section suggests a deeper
look and a more comprehensive overhaul of different intersecting regimes.
Hatch-Waxman was indeed a brilliant legislative innovation, heralding noth-
ing short of a miracle in the reduction of drug costs. Now, it is time to
consider the next generation of the regime so those miracles are not swept
away.25
24 See Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2013) (introducing the phrase “death by tinkering” to describe patent jurispru-
dence in the Federal Circuit).
25 See generally Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do
We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
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II. THE WINDING ROAD TO GENERIC ENTRY
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a deeply complex piece of legislation, codi-
fied in four different sections of the United States Code.26 While it creates a
streamlined pathway for generic manufacturers to seek approval of their
drug, it does so in a way that testifies to the difficulty of satisfying all stake-
holders in the pharmaceutical market. The goal of protecting innovative ac-
tivity, balanced with the desire to make low-cost drugs available to patients,
has produced a labyrinthine series of statutes. Complexity breeds opportu-
nity, however, and Hatch-Waxman’s legacy is littered with evidence of
manipulation.27
This Part focuses on the core components of Hatch-Waxman most often
implicated in generic delay, in the clearest terms possible, omitting discus-
sions of exceptions and complex subsections where appropriate. Later Parts
of this Article will introduce other sections of the Act when needed to help
make sense of these intricate games of generic delay, including descriptions
of amendments meant to tighten the functioning of Hatch-Waxman (while
frequently creating their own difficulties).
Hatch-Waxman created a new framework for the approval and market-
ing of generic medications. Prospective generic manufacturers can submit an
Abbreviated New Drug Application, almost exclusively referred to as an
“ANDA,” to seek approval of a drug equivalent to a reference drug already
approved by the FDA.28 The ANDA must be for a medication bioequivalent
to the brand-name drug,29 and it must generally have the same active ingredi-
ent, route of administration, dosage form, strength, use indications, and la-
beling information as the existing medication.30 An ANDA, however, can
make use of a branded drug company’s pre-existing clinical trial data that
proves the safety and efficacy of the drug.31 This saves the applicant the
years of work and great expense necessary to conduct new clinical trials.
The Hatch-Waxman Act expressly allows the activity necessary to pro-
duce an ANDA to take place without triggering an act of patent infringe-
ment. The use of the patent holder’s data and trial information, as well as
samples of the actual drug to test for bioequivalence, are all exempt from an
assertion of patent infringement when used for ANDA development.32 The
ETHICS 293 (2015) (presenting another recent article reviewing the history of Hatch-Waxman
and suggesting improvements).
26 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
27 FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 160 (“As so often is the case, complexity breeds opportu- R
nity, and clever lawyers have been exploiting the details of the act since its inception.”).
28 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
29 The Act defines two drugs as bioequivalent when “the rate and extent of absorption of
the drug do not show a significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the
listed drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2012).
30 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).
31 See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 12, at 1. R
32 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
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exemption allows generics to be ready for entry by the moment of patent
expiration at the latest, rather than having to wait for patent expiration and
only then begin the process for approval. Prior to Hatch-Waxman, brand-
name drug companies enjoyed a lengthened patent term because no generic
could be ready to market when the patent expired.33
When the brand-name drug company originally files for FDA approval,
the law requires that the company list all patents that “could reasonably be
asserted” against a generic applicant.34 These are then recorded in an FDA
document commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.”35 The Orange Book
has played a prominent role in some of the game playing that has unfolded
across time, as described below.
When a generic drug maker files an ANDA, it must make one of four
“certifications” to each of the patents the brand-name drug maker has listed
for the medication in the Orange Book.36 Most of these certifications result
in limited fuss and bother because they either represent that all the patents
have expired, that no patents are listed in the Orange Book, or that the ge-
neric company will wait until all patents expire before bringing the drug to
market.37
All the action, however, is in what is known as a “Paragraph IV certifi-
cation.” A Paragraph IV certification alleges that the listed patent is either
invalid or would not be infringed by the generic drug.38 In essence, this rep-
resents an attempt by the generic to enter the market before expiration of a
listed Orange Book patent, and it is the core mechanism of Hatch-Waxman.
The entire Paragraph IV process is intended to encourage generic companies
to challenge weak patents as well as to give generics the incentive to do
battle with big pharmaceutical companies.
A Paragraph IV certification is treated as an “artificial” act of patent
infringement. This allows the brand-name drug company to initiate litiga-
tion, which it must do within forty-five days of receiving notification from
the ANDA filer. Otherwise, the FDA may approve the application.39
33 See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“The [brand-name companies] gain for themselves, it is asserted, a de facto monopoly of
upwards of 2 years by enjoining FDA-required testing of a generic drug until the patent on the
drug’s active ingredient expires.”). The case found that use of a patent-protected drug for the
tests necessary for generic development was a prohibited use. Hatch-Waxman was signed into
law five months later.
34 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).
35 FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 160–61. The formal name of the Orange Book is the “Ap- R
proved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations.” See Orange Book: Ap-
proved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(May 17, 2013), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm [https://perma.cc/
WY66-RYJZ].
36 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2012)
(describing the workings of the Orange Book).
37 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(III) (2012).
38 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
39 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
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Why would a generic applicant purposely choose to bring on costly and
potentially damaging litigation? First, there are certainly weak patent claims,
and generic companies have enjoyed considerable success challenging drug
patents.40 Second, baked into Hatch-Waxman is a significant incentive for
the first filer submitting a generic application with a Paragraph IV certifica-
tion to at least one of the listed patents for the drug: as long as the first filer
does not lose its patent infringement case, it is generally entitled to 180 days
of marketing exclusivity alongside the brand-name drug.41 In other words,
for about six months, only the brand-name drug company and the first ge-
neric can sell the drug; no other generic company can come to market. This
essentially creates a duopoly between the brand and generic for the first 180
days after the generic enters, which normally occurs after one of the follow-
ing events: all relevant patents and exclusivities expire; the generic drug
maker wins a challenge invalidating all relevant patents or finding that in-
fringement did not occur; or the generic company reaches a settlement with
the branded drug maker allowing entry.42 This exclusivity period can easily
be worth hundreds of millions of dollars to a generic, representing a substan-
tial majority of the potential profits to be gained from generic entry.43
The Paragraph IV first-filer exclusivity is thus an enormous incentive
for a generic applicant to file as soon as possible and secure the 180 days of
exclusivity, as well as potential market entry long before drug patent expira-
tion. The artificial nature of the patent infringement action is also helpful. It
allows the generic to trigger litigation without actually entering the market
and potentially accruing substantial damages. This complicated and lucrative
pathway also has made Hatch-Waxman susceptible to abuse, mainly because
of the economic incentives created by the exclusivity period.44
40 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 16
(2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-pat-
ent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8FY-J3AC] (finding that
ANDA filers won their Paragraph IV challenge 73% of the time).
41 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). After 2003 amendments to Hatch-Waxman, it
is possible to forfeit the 180-day exclusivity period without losing a patent infringement case.
See infra Part III. Further, it is also possible that the brand-name drug company chooses not to
bring litigation during the forty-five day period. In this case, the first-filer still retains its rights
to 180 days of exclusivity.
42 During the 180-day period, the FDA is not permitted to approve any other generic appli-
cations that have a Paragraph IV certification. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)–(II)
(2012). However, this does not entirely prevent the presence of other competition. Brand-name
companies can launch their own generic version of the drug at a lower price tier (or permit
another company to do so), creating instant competition for the generic. These generics are
often called “authorized generics,” and are discussed infra in Part IV.
43 See Avery, supra note 19, at 178, 178 nn.55–56. R
44 When there are multiple first-filing ANDA applicants (all submitting on the same day,
usually the first day that ANDAs will be accepted), all applicants are eligible for exclusivity.
See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY
WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY (2003), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm072851.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PAE4-6LWE].
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If the patent holder chooses to initiate litigation, a thirty-month stay is
placed on generic approval, with the goal of allowing the infringement liti-
gation to work through the courts while the FDA is reviewing the generic
application.45 The generic application cannot be approved during the follow-
ing thirty months, unless a court enters a final order declaring the patents at
issue invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.46
Although Hatch-Waxman generally is discussed in the framework of
generic drugs, the Act also was designed to add new protections for brand-
name drug companies. Between the Patent and Trademark Office’s (“PTO”)
patent approval process and the FDA’s own approval process for the drug
(which generally overlaps with a portion of the patent term), the effective
life of a drug patent is often substantially shorter than the twenty-year term
of most patents.47 Thus, Hatch-Waxman allows pharmaceutical companies to
receive an extension of the patent term to partially “restore” the time lost to
approval processes.48 This “restoration” is the origin of the Hatch-Waxman
Act’s full name, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act.
The Act also provides certain new drugs with specified non-patent ex-
clusivities. For example, drugs with a new active ingredient never before
approved by the FDA are eligible for five years of marketing exclusivity, in
what is known as new chemical entity (“NCE”) exclusivity.49 This is not an
extension of the patent term—it only means that the FDA is not allowed to
accept applications for generic versions of the drug for at least four years
after initial FDA approval. This, however, gives the brand-name drug maker
breathing space before a generic company can start the ball rolling. Similar
exclusivities are available for new clinical studies that lead to new drug indi-
cations or formulations (three years) and, as established by the Orphan Drug
Act, drugs with indications to treat defined rare diseases (seven years of
marketing exclusivity).50 A six-month exclusivity extension for all approved
indications is available when the drug undergoes pediatric studies requested
by the FDA.51
45 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
46 See id. If the first Paragraph IV generic filer loses its case, it forfeits the 180-day exclu-
sivity period, and the Paragraph IV certification is usually changed to a Paragraph III certifica-
tion agreeing to not enter until the expiration of all FDA and patent exclusivity. See Small
Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069964.htm
[https://perma.cc/NX69-FPMU] (last updated Feb. 11, 2016).
47 See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 12, at 3. R
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012). See generally 35
U.S.C. § 156 (describing the full patent term extension process).
49 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).
50 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii) (2012); 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv) (2012) (ex-
plaining new clinical study exclusivity); 21 U.S.C. §§ 360bb–360cc (2012) (explaining Or-
phan Drug Act definitions and exclusivities).
51 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(c) (2012); see also Kurt R. Karst, Pediatric Exclusivity:
Amazingly Powerful, Essentially Ironclad . . . and Often Overlooked, FDA L. BLOG (July 7,
2015, 7:59 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2015/07/pediatric-
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Important changes have been made to Hatch-Waxman and its related
mechanisms since its enactment, most notably through the Medicare Mod-
ernization Act in 2003 and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007.52 With many of the changes aimed at curbing abuses and plug-
ging loopholes in Hatch-Waxman, a number of these modifications will be
discussed in future Parts when relevant.
In short, Hatch-Waxman set the stage for a new era in medicines: ge-
neric competitors were able to develop and test their products, as well as
apply for FDA approval, before the expiration of the brand-name drug com-
pany’s patent. In addition, the legislation created incentives for generics to
challenge weak patent claims. The goal, of course, was to speed generic
versions of drugs to market as quickly as possible, introducing competition
and dramatically lowering prices for consumers.
III. “G ENERATION 1.0”: THE RISE AND FALL OF TRADITIONAL
PAY-FOR-DELAY
The new dawn was considerably chillier for brand-name drug compa-
nies. Having spent hundreds of millions, if not billions, on research and de-
velopment, the prospect of losing the additional breathing space of profits
loomed large on the horizon. With so much at stake for every moment that
one can delay the entry of generic competitors, the strategy of pay-for-delay
emerged.53 It is an ingenious approach in which the brand-name drug com-
pany shares a portion of its monopoly profits with the generic company in
exchange for the generic company agreeing to stay out of the market. Specif-
ically, in pay-for-delay, the brand-name company settles its Paragraph IV
lawsuit with the generic company. Under the terms of the settlement, the
generic receives a cash payment and agrees to delay its entry into the market
for a specified period of time.
These settlements are sometimes referred to as “reverse payment”
schemes, a reference to the fact that payment is transferred from the suing
exclusivity-amazingly-powerful-essentially-ironclad-and-often-overlooked.html [https://perma
.cc/GZS4-YYCX] (noting that pediatric exclusivity also applies to all protected indications
and formulations of the reference drug, not just pediatric indications that may exist).
52 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003); Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
53 See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006); C. Scott Hemphill, An
Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Compe-
tition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law
and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009); Steve D. Shadowen, Keith B. Leffler &
Joseph T. Lukens, Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2009); Matthew Avery & Mary Nguyen, The Roadblock for Generic Drugs:
Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction for Later Generic Challengers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2013); Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2008).
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brand-name drug company to the defending generic competitor, countering
the standard expectation that a defendant would pay a plaintiff to settle a
suit. The practice has come to light as Paragraph IV challenges have signifi-
cantly increased over the last twenty years54 and the median time from FDA
approval of a brand-name drug to first Paragraph IV challenge by a generic
company has dropped dramatically.55
With pay-for-delay settlements, the incentives of both the brand-name
drug company and the generic company are aligned. In most cases, delaying
the entry date does not matter as much to the first generic filer.56 Demand is
relatively inelastic for blockbuster drugs, meaning that annual sales are un-
likely to fall sharply before the expiration of the patent term. Thus, as Pro-
fessor Hemphill notes, as long as a generic first filer is able to enjoy the
entire 180-day exclusivity period, the generic does not particularly care if it
has to wait until the end of the patent term to do so.57
In addition, when the generic eventually enters the market, the competi-
tion will drive down the price of the drug substantially and neither company
will be able to charge the supracompetitive price that the brand-name drug
company enjoyed on its own. Given that delayed entry keeps the price high,
the brand-name drug company can “share” some of that monopoly profit in
the form of a settlement payment. Thus, with pay-for-delay, the generic gets
a share of the profits from monopoly pricing and still eventually gets its 180
days of exclusivity from other generics as well, when it eventually gets to
market. Both parties are happy. The biggest loser is destined to be the public,
which continues to suffer higher prices during the period of delay. For exam-
54 See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Pat-
ents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 624, 624 fig.4 (2011) (finding that by 2009, 22% of
drugs approved between 1985 and 1987 were subject to a Paragraph IV challenge, compared
to 55% of drugs approved between 2000 and 2002); see also Hemphill, An Aggregate Ap-
proach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 657–58 (noting increased intensity of antitrust enforce- R
ment and development of new strategies starting around 1997).
55 See Henry Grabowski et al., Pharmaceutical Patent Challenges and Their Implications
for Innovation and Generic Competition fig.3 (Am. Econ. Ass’n, Working Paper, 2015), https:/
/www.aeaweb.org/aea/2015conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=1203 [https://perma.cc/
6A6X-TLPC]. In fact, as of 2006, the median number of years to a Paragraph IV challenge
had dropped to a flat four years for both drugs with annual sales greater than $1 billion and
those with sales less than $1 billion. Id. The FDA cannot accept a Paragraph IV ANDA until
four years after the reference drug was initially approved for drugs with a theretofore unap-
proved active ingredient. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).
56 See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 53, at 1583. R
57 Id. Granted, the present value of money received closer to the decision date would be
slightly higher than the present value of funds received later in the patent term. This is a small
factor unlikely to undermine the logic used here. Further, as described in an earlier assump-
tion, profits will not actually automatically drop to zero for both firms at the end of the 180-
day exclusivity period. The first-filer will earn some profits even after the duopoly has been
dismantled, giving the first-filer a reason to negotiate or desire an earlier entry date. Id. at
1585. Even if the certification is withdrawn or the first generic filer loses its infringement case,
the six months of exclusivity are not available to any subsequent filer.
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ple, the FTC has estimated that reverse payment settlements cost consumers
$3.5 billion each year.58
As part of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, Congress made
changes to Hatch-Waxman that can cause a generic first filer to lose its 180
days of exclusivity if it enters into a pay-for-delay settlement.59 Parties, how-
ever, have found a way to work around the new provisions. Five years after
the 2003 amendment, monetary pay-for-delay settlements had instead in-
creased, along with the rising popularity of Paragraph IV challenges.60 The
new provision did little to stem the tide.
Pharmaceutical companies have argued vigorously that pay-for-delay
settlements are not anticompetitive, arguing that they can be understood as
no more than devices by which the two parties respond to the uncertainty of
patent infringement litigation.61 Given the probabilistic nature of success in
the lawsuit brought on by a Paragraph IV certification, the two parties calcu-
late what they believe their relative position is in the litigation and then settle
based on what they believe to be the expected value of bringing the litigation
to its conclusion. Some argue further that such settlements are even procom-
petitive because the generic is typically allowed to enter the market before
the last relevant patent expires.62 Thus, as a result of the settlement, the pub-
lic will enjoy lower prices sooner than they would have—a result that would
be consistent with the goals of Hatch-Waxman.
This argument suffers from two flaws. First, it ignores the fact that Par-
agraph IV litigation specifically questions the validity and applicability of
the patent.63 If the patent is invalid or inapplicable to the drug, the brand-
name company should have no exclusionary power.64 In other words, there is
no such thing as “early entry” if the patent should not exist at all.65 Second,
even if a patent is valid, it is not a license to engage in any and all activity,
58 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-for-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUM-
ERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-
cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff [https://perma.cc/X8JJ-DB98].
59 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2012).
60 Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 649 tbl.2, 660. R
61 FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 163. R
62 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
63 See id. at 2225; Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at R
637–38.
64 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2225.
65 See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 858–60 (Cal. 2015) (offering a cogent
explanation of how patents are best seen not as inherently valid or invalid, but rather as only
“a right to ask the government to exercise its power to keep others from using an invention
without consent”). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 2 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75 (2005). Concurring, one of the authors of this piece has described a
patent as creating “no more than an opportunity to bargain. It is an invitation to enter into a
process of negotiating a definition of rights.” FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 2; see also Lear, Inc. R
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (“A patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal
conclusion reached by the Patent Office.”), cited in In re K–Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197,
214–15 (3d Cir. 2012); cf. Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the
Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 1 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61
(2014).
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no matter how anticompetitive.66 With any party that holds a legitimate mo-
nopoly position in the market, the antitrust laws place limits on what one can
do with that monopoly power.67
After years of FTC action and cases that bounced around lower courts,
the Supreme Court finally weighed in with its 2013 decision in FTC v. Ac-
tavis. The case involved a pay-for-delay settlement with the agreed upon
entry date occurring prior to the patent’s expiration date.68 The Supreme
Court ruled that the FTC’s case against a brand-name firm should have not
been dismissed and that pay-for-delay settlements are open to antitrust scru-
tiny.69 Ruling that some pay-for-delay settlements may very well be an-
ticompetitive, the Court declined to hold that reverse payment settlements
are presumptively unlawful, however, preferring instead a rule of reason
test.70
The rule of reason is a laborious standard that has been described by
courts and commentators as difficult to meet and burdensome on both plain-
tiffs and the judicial system.71 The test involves complex economic analysis,
requires extensive information about industries that may be difficult to ob-
tain, and follows an amorphous set of standards that are difficult to pin down
and establish.72 Thus, plaintiffs in an antitrust case try to avoid the rule of
66 For a detailed history of the development of antitrust limitations on behavior involving
patents, see Robin Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 399, 405–17 (2003).
67 See generally Kimble v. Marvel Enters. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (deciding that agree-
ments to pay royalties on sales after the expiration of a patent are illegal). For information on
limitations on monopoly power legitimately gained, see generally Robin Feldman, Patent and
Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2008).
68 It is worth noting that the settlement in Actavis was not a pure cash payment. Along
with a payment to Actavis of approximately $19–30 million per year for nine years, Actavis
also agreed to promote a drug sold by the brand-name company, among other considerations
(two other generic companies—Par and Paddock, who were not first filers—also settled with
the brand-name company). See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229. See infra Part IV for more
information about settlements involving “side deals.”
69 Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
70 Id.
71 See Robin Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, for a discussion of the rule of
reason and the extensive criticism of it. 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2107–08 (1999) (citing the follow-
ing sources: Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (comparing the rule of reason to the odd form of per se rule applied in tying cases
and describing both as requiring extensive and time-consuming economic analysis); Continen-
tal T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977) (describing rule of reason as complex
and burdensome on litigants and the judicial system); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that rule of reason analysis requires complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of an industry and related industries); Robert
Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 830, 830 n.42 (1987) (ex-
plaining that the court refused to apply rule of reason given the practical difficulties of the
minute inquiry required into economic organization)).
72 See 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1502, at 371–72 (1986). The classic
description of the rule of reason can be found in the seminal antitrust treatise by the late Philip
Areeda. The plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing that the behavior restrains competi-
tion in a properly defined market, which includes delineating the relevant product and geo-
graphic markets. If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that its behavior serves legitimate objectives. If the defendant meets this burden, the
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reason by framing the case to fit into one of a limited number of per se
categories.
Although the rule of reason test traditionally has been the death knell
for antitrust cases, the Supreme Court opened the door to serious antitrust
consideration by suggesting that lower courts “structure” the rule of reason
in these cases.73 Most important, the Court concluded that “a reverse pay-
ment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant
anticompetitive effects.”74
In the aftermath of Actavis, courts and parties have taken the Supreme
Court’s message to heart when it comes to pay-for-delay settlements in
cash.75 In the FTC’s report on agreements between brand-name and generic
companies in fiscal year 2014—the first full year after Actavis—the FTC
found that the number of suspected pay-for-delay settlements dropped to
twenty-one, compared to twenty-nine in fiscal year 2013 and the record-high
of forty in 2012.76
Pay-for-delay agreements are also under fire outside of the United
States. In early 2016, the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Au-
thority announced total fines of £45 million against pharmaceutical compa-
nies engaging in pay-for-delay settlements.77 Between 2001 and 2004, a
brand-name company had paid generics £50 million to delay entry of a pop-
ular antidepressant into the UK market.78
Looking again at the United States, two cases, in particular, also signal
the beginning of the end for traditional delay games, leaving no doubt that
plaintiff must then establish that the defendant could meet its objective using a less restrictive
alternative. If the matter is still unresolved at this point, the court must weigh the harms and
benefits of the restraint with the plaintiff shouldering the burden at this stage to show that the
restraint is unreasonable on balance. See also Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust,
supra note 71, at 2107 n.143. R
73 For analysis of the Actavis case, see generally Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28
ANTITRUST 16 (2013); Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of
Reason, supra note 65; Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7 R
(2014).
74 Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
75 For further analysis of how courts have treated the Actavis decision, see generally Mi-
chele M. Kang, ANDA Reverse Payments and the Post-Actavis Landscape, 8 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 73 (2016).
76 See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FED.
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MOD-
ERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2014, at 4 exhibit 1, https:/
/www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-commission-
under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/
6K2Y-NXM3]. Note that under the FTC’s definition of a pay-for-delay agreement, some of
these agreements include side deals and “no-AG” clauses that will be discussed infra in Part
IV.
77 Press Release, U.K. Competition & Mkts. Auth., CMA Fines Pharma Companies £45
Million (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-fines-pharma-companies-
45-million [http://perma.cc/MAU2-UPRY].
78 The settlements included cash payments as well as supply and distribution agreements.
See Jeff Overley, GSK Fined $54M Over UK ‘Pay-For-Delay’ Deals, LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2016,
11:03 AM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/758706 [https://perma.cc/FJ6Z-D2D8].
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the guidance in Actavis is being used to heavily scrutinize these settlements.
In the case of In re Cipro, the California Supreme Court applied Actavis to
California’s own antitrust law, which follows certain aspects of federal law.79
The case concerned a pay-for-delay settlement regarding Bayer’s popular an-
tibiotic, Cipro. Noting the probabilistic nature of patents and the uncertain
nature of their validity, the court implemented a “structured rule of reason”
test for scrutiny of reverse payment settlements, one falling somewhere be-
tween the notion that such settlements are per se illegal and the amorphous
rule of reason.80 The test focuses on whether the value of that reverse pay-
ment exceeded litigation costs combined with the value of any other services
the generic might agree to provide to the brand.81 Critically, the court held
that in presenting any procompetitive arguments in favor of the settlement,
the brand-name company may not include arguments that the patent is actu-
ally valid or that the settlement allowed pre-expiration entry.82
Similarly, in the spring of 2015, Teva agreed to pay $512 million to
settle a class action brought by direct purchasers of the company’s drug
Provigil, a widely-used narcolepsy drug.83 The lawsuit had accused Teva of
paying four different generic competitors—who had all filed their ANDA for
Provigil on the same day—over $300 million to stay out of the market for
six years.84 The settlement was the largest-ever for direct purchasers in a
pay-for-delay case.
Just over a month after settling with direct purchasers, Teva agreed to
settle similar antitrust claims with the FTC, bringing the total settlement to
$1.2 billion, by far the largest settlement ever secured by the FTC.85 The
79 See generally In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2015).
80 Id. at 862–63.
81 Id. at 865–67.
82 Id. at 870–71.
83 Kelly Knaub, Teva to Pay $512M to End Provigil Pay-For-Delay Dispute, LAW360
(Apr. 20, 2015, 3:38 PM), http://www.law360.com/lifesciences/articles/645224/teva-to-pay-
512m-to-end-provigil-pay-for-delay-dispute [http://perma.cc/SNY8-G4VF]; Katie Thomas,
Teva to Pay $512 Million to Settle Suit Over Delay of Sleep Disorder Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/business/teva-to-pay-512-million-to-settle-
suit-over-delay-of-sleep-disorder-drug.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2L53-C3N4]. The drug
was originally sold by Cephalon, a company bought by Teva in 2011. Chris V. Nicholson, Teva
to Buy Cephalon for $6.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/05/02/teva-to-buy-cephalon-for-6-8-billion/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/6FJN-BB2S].
84 See Rebecca R. Ruiz & Katie Thomas, Teva Settles Cephalon Generics Case with
F.T.C. for $1.2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/bus-
iness/teva-cephalon-provigil-ftc-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/4EXE-WQM7]; Matthew
Bultman, FTC Can Seek Disgorgement in Cephalon Suit, Judge Says, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2015,
1:48 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/643622/ftc-can-seek-disgorgement-in-cephalon-
suit-judge-says [http://perma.cc/8SZD-EBCG].
85 See Ruiz & Thomas, supra note 84; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of R
Competition, FTC Settlement of Cephalon Pay for Delay Case Ensures $1.2 Billion in Ill-
Gotten Gains Relinquished; Refunds Will Go to Purchasers Affected by Anticompetitive Tac-
tics (May 28, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlement-
cephalon-pay-delay-case-ensures-12-billion-ill [https://perma.cc/WBB4-JPGB]; Brent
Kendall, Teva, FTC Reach $1.2 Billion Settlement on Cephalon’s Provigil, WALL ST. J. (May
28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/teva-close-to-ftc-settlement-on-cephalons-provigil-val-
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settlement came five days after an unfavorable ruling from a federal judge in
the case.86
At the end of the day, however, Teva may still have profited hand-
somely from its behavior—although not nearly as handsomely as it had ex-
pected. Shortly after reaching the pay-for-delay settlement in 2006, one high
level executive commented that, “[w]e were able to get six more years of
patent protection. That’s $4 billion in sales that no one expected.”87 Even
considering the FTC’s lower end estimate of $3.5 billion in profit from the
delay, the company was still left with $2.3 billion after settling with the class
action plaintiffs and the FTC.88
IV. “G ENERATION 2.0”: PAY-FOR-DELAY TAKES NEW,
COMPLICATED FORMS
A. Already Steps Ahead of Actavis
Although Actavis dealt a severe blow to pay-for-delay settlements, it
came years too late. Drug manufacturers had long moved on to other forms
of settlement, specifically, combining delay provisions with other agree-
ments meant to obscure the fact that the generic firm is still receiving large
considerations in return for delay. In these “Generation 2.0” games, the re-
verse payment is still very much alive—it is just not so clearly denoted by
dollar signs.
The first Generation 2.0 settlement is generally understood to be a 1997
agreement to delay entry of K–Dur, a drug treating potassium deficiencies.89
In the agreement, the first generic filer agreed to delay entering the market
for approximately four years. What differed in this first Generation 2.0
agreement was what the brand-name drug company added to the agreement.
The brand-name drug agreed to buy licenses to multiple medications from
the generic—in particular, a cholesterol drug known as Niacor-SR, which
the generic had developed. The brand-name drug company paid the generic
$60 million and agreed to pay royalties on Niacor-SR, depending on its sales
of the product.90 The two parties quickly abandoned their plans to make
Niacor-SR, leaving the $60 million “license” payment intact.91
ued-at-roughly-1-billion-1432813288 [http://perma.cc/4PTV-XBJ5]. The $1.2 billion figure
includes the $512 million secured in the direct purchaser settlement.
86 Bultman, supra note 84. R
87 Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cephalon, Inc., No.
08CV00244, 2008 WL 446785 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008).
88 Bultman, supra note 84 (noting the FTC’s $3.5 billion figure). The $2.3 billion figure R
was estimated by subtracting the $1.2 billion settlement from the $3.5 billion in profit from
delay.
89 See In re K–Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2012); Hemphill, An
Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 658. R
90 See In re K–Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 205–06.
91 Id. at 206. Also suspicious is the following: The generic demanded cash and early entry
when the settlement was first being negotiated. But, concerned about pay-for-delay antitrust
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The K–Dur case presents the archetypical form of a classic Generation
2.0 settlement.92 As part of a generic delay agreement, the two parties agree
to provide services for each other, frequently referred to as “side deals” and
often related to other drugs in one of the firms’ portfolio. Cash is often still
exchanged, but it is disguised as a payment for the other services mentioned
in the agreement. As detailed below, these services can include: promises on
the part of the generic to promote or market the brand-name drug (“co-
promote deals”); licensing deals allowing the brand-name drug company or
the generic to manufacture the other party’s drug; similar “authorized ge-
neric” agreements permitting the generic to manufacture and/or sell the
brand-name formulation as a generic without ANDA approval, with profit-
sharing or royalty deals attached; agreements to share research and develop-
ment duties on a future project; deals to supply the brand-name company
with raw materials for manufacturing; and more.93
In most cases, the result is that the generic is “overpaid” for the ser-
vices it supposedly furnishes to the brand—with the difference between the
market value and the actual payment being the cash consideration for the
delay.94 In the alternative, the generic may “underpay” for something it re-
ceives from the brand-name drug company, such as the right to make other
drugs from the brand-name drug company’s portfolio.95
A particularly questionable part of these side deals is that the services
promised are often beyond the generic’s capability. For example, a generic
company generally does little marketing and relies on the fact that pharma-
cists will automatically substitute a generic drug when filling a prescription
listing the brand-name drug. How, then, could a generic manufacturer offer
marketing and promotion services that a brand-name company would find
desirable? And, as Hemphill notes, it is rarely obvious that a generic firm
would be the most effective manufacturing and supply partner for a large
brand-name company.96 The side deals are hollow promises that may or may
not ever be fulfilled. Rather, they may function purely as a fac¸ade for the
pay-for-delay deal that lies beneath the language of the settlement. Teasing
out these pay-for-delay deals, however, can be quite difficult.
B. In re Lipitor: Everything But the Kitchen Sink
While the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit appeared to easily see
through the intent of the two parties’ side deal in K–Dur, getting to the bot-
scrutiny even back in 1997, the brand-name company would not agree to these more basic
terms. Id. at 205.
92 Recall that Actavis also had elements of a Generation 2.0 settlement (e.g. side deals,
installment payments). We associate Actavis with Generation 1.0 in this Article given that the
Actavis argument has been successfully applied only to cash deals as of now.
93 See Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 663–66. R
94 See id. at 663–64. See generally Carrier, Payment After Actavis, supra note 73. R
95 See Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 665–66. R
96 See id. at 668.
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tom of a settlement is not always so easy. Clarity is particularly difficult to
achieve when companies settle multiple Hatch-Waxman cases at once, dis-
tributing the payoffs in a way that quickly becomes quite complex.
Consider the case of In re Lipitor, which involved one of the most
tangled sets of agreements in all of generic delay.97 Lipitor, a statin used to
lower cholesterol, is widely known as the best-selling drug in history, with
over $125 billion in sales between 1996 and eventual generic entry in late
2011.98 It is no surprise that Lipitor’s manufacturer, Pfizer, went to unprece-
dented lengths to protect the monopoly on its ultra-blockbuster. A protracted
six-year battle between Pfizer, and the first generic filer, Ranbaxy, led to a
settlement including delay of generic Lipitor.99 Scrutiny of this settlement
then led to multiple class action lawsuits.100
Together, the resulting litigation implicated issues including, but not
limited to: sham litigation, sham patent obtainment through data falsifica-
tion, Orange Book listings (and patents not listed in the Orange Book), sham
citizen petitions, multiple and staggered suits, multiple settlements, and even
ANDA approval delay on the part of Ranbaxy through a delay in moving the
site of generic manufacture to an FDA-approved facility.101 For the sake of
clarity, this discussion will only focus on the terms of the eventual settle-
ment between Pfizer and the first generic filer.
In the 2008 settlement, the generic company agreed to delay release of
generic Lipitor until late 2011.102 In return, Pfizer gave the generic the right
to market generic Lipitor in eleven international markets. Pfizer also re-
97 See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523 (D.N.J. 2014) (dismissing direct
purchasers’ class actions); see also FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 162; Hemphill, An Aggregate R
Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 638–39, 683. R
98 See Lipitor Becomes World’s Top-Selling Drug, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 28, 2011),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20111228/HEALTH_CARE/111229902 [http://perma
.cc/6FVA-CDPH].
99 See Direct Purchasers’ Amended Complaint and Demand for July Trial at para. 87, In re
Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (Nos. 3:12-cv-2389 &
3:12-cv-4115), 2013 WL 5669146 (dismissing direct purchasers’ class actions).
100 See id. See generally End-Payor Plaintiffs’ Amended Consolidated Class Action Com-
plaint and Jury Demand, In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523 (D.N.J. Oct. 15,
2013) (No. 3:12-cv-2389), 2013 WL 7117787 (breaking down all the alleged methods of delay
in the case).
101 See End-Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100 (breaking down all the alleged R
methods of delay in the case); see also In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 3:12-cv-2389, 2013
WL 4780496, at *12 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (granting in part and denying in part motion to
dismiss class action claims and referencing the claims regarding Ranbaxy’s purposeful negli-
gence of data integrity and manufacturing practices); see also Complaint and Jury Demand,
Meijer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-11828, 2015 WL 2219184 (D. Mass. May 12, 2015)
(arguing manufacturing problems have been widespread for Ranbaxy and the result of their
haste to put in ANDAs and lock in 180-day exclusivity).
102 In re Lipitor, 2013 WL 4780496, at *12. Complaint alleged this aspect of the settle-
ment created an ANDA bottleneck that blocked the approval of subsequent ANDAs. End-
Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at paras. 373–92. R
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solved other litigation with the generic involving the drugs Caduet and
Accupril.103
In a class action complaint, end payors alleged that this settlement rep-
resented an unlawful reverse payment.104 Their argument was as follows:
Pfizer knew it was unlikely to win its remaining challenges to the launch of
generic Lipitor.105 However, it had a very strong case against the generic
regarding the other drug, Accupril.106 In fact, it was widely believed that the
suit over Accupril could have easily been worth hundreds of millions of
dollars in damages.107 In exchange for letting the generic go on the Accupril
litigation (for a seemingly trivial $1 million paid by the generic), it was able
to secure delay in the launch of generic Lipitor. Thus, while the Lipitor set-
tlement involved no cash exchange, and the Accupril settlement involved
only $1 million, complainants alleged that Pfizer’s stunning and unexpected
act of generosity regarding Accupril was actually a “massive [reverse] pay-
ment worth hundreds of millions of dollars to [the generic].”108 In other
words, Pfizer paid for the delay by giving up another case worth hundreds of
millions of dollars.
To put an obfuscating bow around the entire deal, Pfizer allegedly initi-
ated a separate sham lawsuit in order to create the illusion of a lawful settle-
ment. At the time of the settlement, Pfizer had no pending litigation against
103 In re Lipitor, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 532–33. Also dismissed was a process suit over the
same two patents asserted against Ranbaxy over Lipitor. See End-Payor Amended Complaint,
supra note 100, at paras. 270–82. R
104 End-Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at paras. 393–95. R
105 A district court had already enjoined approval of Ranbaxy’s ANDA until March 2010
by upholding one of Pfizer’s patents. In re Lipitor, 2013 WL 4780496, at *7; FELDMAN, supra
note 13, at 162. Pfizer’s infringement claim on its second patent (the subject of much contro- R
versy) was not upheld. It then turned to reissue proceedings for that second patent as well as a
citizen petition to attempt to delay entry. In re Lipitor, 2013 WL 4780496, at *6–10. Together,
complainants allege the only thing preventing generic entry in March 2010 was a patent reis-
sue application that had a “real risk” of being “denied” and a citizen petition that was still
pending. End-Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at paras. 243, 266. R
106 In a bizarre series of events, Ranbaxy (partnering with Teva) launched a generic ver-
sion of Accupril at-risk in December 2004—meaning that it launched before a judgment was
made as to the validity or invalidity of Pfizer’s patents and thus presenting the possibility that it
could face substantial damages if the patents were later judged to be valid and infringed. In re
Lipitor, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 532. It did so despite Pfizer having already secured summary judg-
ment that an earlier ANDA applicant had infringed patents related to Accupril. Id. at 531.
Pfizer’s sales of Accupril dropped from $534 million in 2004 to just $71 million after generic
launch. End-Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at para. 296. In light of the other R
Accupril decision over the first ANDA, a court granted a preliminary injunction on sales of
generic Accupril, and Pfizer appeared to be very confident that Ranbaxy would be found liable
for hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. In fact, they requested that treble damages be
awarded under the theory that Ranbaxy willfully infringed the Accupril patents. End-Payor
Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at paras. 310–11. Yet, as described infra, Pfizer was R
apparently willing to settle the case for only $1 million.
107 End-Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at paras. 314–18. R
108 Id. at para. 314.
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the generic regarding Lipitor.109 However, if the company’s aim was to get a
settlement that included the delay of Lipitor, there had to be a pending Lip-
itor case to settle. Thus, Pfizer sued the generic over infringement of two
process patents not listed in the Orange Book for Lipitor—two patents for
which a court had already said Pfizer had no standing to assert against the
generic.110 Three months later, Pfizer and the generic company reached their
“agreement” to settle the newly initiated litigation.111 With all terms consid-
ered, some industry estimates pegged the value of the settlement at more
than $1.5 billion for the generic.112 How much of that figure, however, was
payment for keeping Lipitor off the market?
In 2014, this question came before the District Court for the District of
New Jersey. The court dismissed direct purchaser class actions for failure to
state a claim because the plaintiffs were unable to provide “a reliable esti-
mate” of the monetary value of the reverse payment.113 It can indeed be
difficult to tease out the value of a reverse payment, making these types of
complex settlements an attractive option for pharmaceutical companies.
First, the plaintiff in this case would need to determine the market value of
each piece of the settlement, including the value to the generic of: ending the
(supposedly sham) litigation between Pfizer and the generic; earning the
rights to market generic Lipitor in international markets; ending the Accupril
case; and ending the Caduet litigation.114 Next, the plaintiff would have to
show how much the generic actually “paid” for these pieces of the settle-
ment and then prove that the gap between the market value and the actual
value of the settlement represents the reverse payment from Pfizer to the
generic to secure Lipitor delay. This presents an enormous hurdle for a
plaintiff to clear, and it has led to the dismissal of other related Lipitor class
actions.115
109 But it was waiting on the results of a pending citizen petition and an application for
reissuance of one of its Lipitor patents. Plus, Ranbaxy was already enjoined from receiving
ANDA approval and entering the market until 2010. In re Lipitor, 2013 WL 4780496, at *7.
110 End-Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at paras. 270–82. One reason that the R
patents could not be legitimately asserted is that they were not “Hatch-Waxman” patents listed
in the Orange Book. Recall that an ANDA filing is only artificially a patent infringement
action against the patents listed in the Orange Book. Since the patents were not listed, no
infringement real or artificial could have taken place. Thus, there was no “justiciable case or
controversy” since the “mere threat of [future] litigation” could not support the case for
Pfizer’s preliminary injunction. In re Lipitor, 2013 WL 4780496, at *10; Hemphill, An Aggre-
gate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 639 n. 39. R
111 End-Payor Amended Complaint, supra note 100, at para. 279. R
112 Id. at para. 284.
113 In re Lipitor, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
114 So little about the Caduet litigation was mentioned in the end-payor complaint that the
district court cited it as a reason for dismissing the case, since the complaint failed to address
in any way how settling the Caduet litigation factored into the global scope of the settlement.
In re Lipitor, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 523, 533, 548.
115 In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, No. 3:12-cv-02389 (D. N.J. Oct. 30, 2014), http://
assets.law360news.com/0592000/592594//mnt/rails_cache/https-ecf-njd-uscourts-gov-doc1-
11919306435.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HKR-EJEF] (dismissing end-payors’ class action suit).
Appeals continued after the dismissals. See Kelly Knaub, 3rd Circ. Urged to Merge Lipitor,
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C. Contract Clauses and King Drug
Lipitor was not the only set of cases dismissed for an apparent failure to
define the scope of a reverse payment. In a few other cases, courts also have
not been easily persuaded that side deals constitute a reverse payment, par-
ticularly in the context of renewed debate after Actavis over the definition of
what constitutes a “large, unjustified” payment.116 Other Generation 2.0 set-
tlements, however, do not hinge on actual service contracts or settling multi-
ple cases; rather, the contract clauses themselves can serve as indirect
payments and bottlenecks to prevent later generics from entering.
One popular contract item is an “acceleration clause” (also known as a
“coordination clause”). An acceleration clause stipulates that the generic
company, which has agreed to delay entry, may immediately enter the mar-
ket if another generic is able to jump the queue and get into the market
before the first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period ends (or even before it be-
gins). This can happen through a variety of complex strategies, described
below, that later-filing generics may be able to use in certain circum-
stances.117 With an acceleration clause, the first-filer is not locked into its
agreed entry date if another generic manufacturer is able to break through
the exclusivity period fence.
The true benefit of an acceleration clause, however, is not the reassur-
ance it provides to the delaying generic entrant. Rather, it is the disincentive
the clause creates for other prospective generics. After an acceleration clause
is put in place, any generic looking to find a way onto the market does so
with the knowledge that, if they are successful, they will immediately face
generic competition from the first-filer. Thus, entrance is less attractive, es-
pecially given the legal battle necessary to employ the strategies that will
secure an earlier place on the market for a later-filing generic. In turn, the
chance that the first-filer will be able to launch as the only generic—with the
180-day exclusivity period intact—is increased. Also improved is the chance
that the brand-name drug company will be able to enjoy the full delay period
as the monopoly seller, as well as the full 180-day duopoly period when the
Effexor Antitrust Appeals, LAW360 (Apr. 3, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
639404/3rd-circ-urged-to-merge-lipitor-effexor-antitrust-appeals [https://perma.cc/V3BB-
PLVF]. Some argue that the standard used in Lipitor requiring a “ballpark” estimate of the
payment sets too high a bar. Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 585, 600–01 (2015). In Actavis, the Supreme Court cast suspicion on
settlement payments that far exceeded expected litigation costs. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). Thus, Edlin et al. argue that a mere showing that the
payment exceeded anticipated litigation costs is enough to sustain an Actavis claim. Edlin et
al., supra, at 600–01.
116 See generally In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss); In re Loestrin
24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180 (D.R.I. 2014) (granting motion to dismiss), vacated,
No. 14-2071, 2016 WL 698077 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2016).
117 See discussion infra Section V.E for more details on some of these strategies.
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first-filer finally enters. In essence, the brand-name firm pays the generic by
reducing the risk of competition in exchange for a commitment to delay.118
Of particular note among the contract clauses are ones this Article la-
bels “boy scout clauses”—that is, clauses in which the brand-name com-
pany promises good behavior but does so in a way that has anticompetitive
effects. Consider the issue of authorized generics. Brand-name companies
often introduce generic versions of their own drugs, at a lower, unbranded
price tier, to compete against the incoming first filer. Given that the brand-
name company already has FDA approval, it is not subject to generic ap-
proval processes, and, therefore, its own generic version is not restricted
from entering the market during the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period.
This allows the brand-name company to hold onto a portion of the profits
that would otherwise go to the first generic filer, and it reduces the incentive
for entering generics. Early on, commentators expressed concern about the
potential anticompetitive effects of the practice and whether it undermines
the Hatch-Waxman incentive structure.119
Against this backdrop, some brand-name companies have included a
clause in their pay-for-delay settlements known as a “no-authorized-generic
agreement” (“no-AG agreement”). In a no-AG agreement, a brand-name
firm agrees not to launch a generic form of its drug until the first-filer’s 180-
day exclusivity period has expired. In return, the potential generic manufac-
turer delays entry. The brand-name company, of course, retains the right to
continue selling the more expensive branded version of the drug through
both the generic delay period and the 180 days of exclusivity.
What is so clever about this form of agreement is the following: having
received criticism for its behavior of creating authorized generics, the brand-
name company now stands up and faithfully swears not to engage in the
practice. What matters, however, is the context. The brand-name company is
agreeing to shun this practice in exchange for an agreement that the generic
will delay its entry. The value of forgoing authorized generic entry becomes
part of the payment for delay. In other words, having developed inappropri-
ate behaviors, the brand-name company can now agree to forgo them, using
the value of what would have been ill-gotten gains to pay the generic. All of
this is wrapped in the guise of a boy-scout-like promise to be on good be-
118 A recent complaint alleges that a brand-name firm included acceleration clauses in
delay agreements with three different ANDA filers (who all filed first on the same day) in
order to reduce the incentive for Teva to launch a generic, and using a strategy in which Teva
argued that its generic would not be used for patent-protected indications of Actos. Cf. Consol-
idated Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand, In re Actos Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.,
No. 1:15-cv-03278, 2015 WL 4600605 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2015).
119 For a detailed analysis of the effects of authorized generics, notably concluding that
authorized generics are generally procompetitive and price-reducing, but may cause harm
when coupled with no-authorized-generic agreements, see generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, AU-
THORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT (2011), http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/64U3-HL7P]. The FTC
also noted limited cases where the anticipated presence of authorized generic competition
could have been a disincentive for potential generics.
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havior. It is a little like the schoolyard bully who agrees to stop hitting the
younger kids in exchange for their lunch money. When hauled into the prin-
cipal’s office, he says in great seriousness, “but didn’t you want me to stop
hitting them?”120 A later version of a boy-scout clause appears in the Gener-
ation 3.0 tactics in the form of no-product-hopping agreements.121
A very recent case involving a no-AG agreement is King Drug, which
led to a landmark opinion in June 2015 from the Court of Appeals of the
Third Circuit.122 The Third Circuit was among the first to look skeptically at
side deals involving cash in K-Dur; in King Drug, that skepticism was ex-
tended to non-cash reverse payments such as no-AG agreements.123 The
court found that such payments are not immune to Actavis-style rule of rea-
son scrutiny and that direct purchasers suing over the settlement in question
had sufficiently pleaded their Sherman Act claims.124
King Drug arose out of a settlement between GlaxoSmithKline and the
first generic filer over Glaxo’s brand drug Lamictal, an anticonvulsant drug
used to treat epilepsy and bipolar disorder. In the Paragraph IV litigation, the
district judge invalidated the primary claim in the Lamictal patent.125 One
month later, the parties agreed to settle in what was, by that point, a case that
the brand drug company was likely to lose.126
No cash was exchanged as part of the settlement. Instead, Glaxo al-
lowed the generic to enter the $50 million market for chewable Lamictal
thirty-seven months before the patent expired; however, the settlement did
not permit entry into the more lucrative $2 billion Lamictal tablet market
until one day before the expiration of Glaxo’s exclusivity. Employing a no-
AG agreement, Glaxo also agreed that it would not introduce its own generic
version of Lamictal tablets until after the generic’s 180-day exclusivity pe-
riod.127 Direct purchasers challenged this settlement in a class action, alleg-
ing that the no-authorized-generic agreement was an anticompetitive reverse
payment.
In June 2015, the Third Circuit agreed that a no-AG agreement may
represent an “unusual, unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value”
under Actavis, allowing the antitrust claims to continue.128 The reasoning
120 In this case, however, the lunch money is coming from consumers, who pay in the
form of higher prices.
121 See infra Section V.B.
122 But cf. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. Oct.
6, 2014) (granting a firm’s motion to dismiss a generic’s claims that a no-AG agreement consti-
tuted an illegal reverse payment).
123 King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir.
2015).
124 Id. at 409.
125 Id. at 397.
126 Id. at 409–10.
127 Id. at 397.
128 Id. at 394. The early entry to the chewable market was largely ignored in the opinion,
mainly because the size of the market is magnitudes smaller than the tablet market. Even if this
agreement were slightly competitive, the court decided “plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged
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applied was similar to that of Actavis, but the court also explained the ways
in which a non-cash payment such as this could have considerable value for
both parties. In particular, if the court had reached a final judgment that the
generic did not infringe the patent—which seemed likely at this point—the
generic would have been able to enter the tablet market long before the set-
tlement entry date, bringing down the price at an earlier time while enjoying
its 180 days of exclusivity.129 In exchange for dodging this bullet, the brand-
name company agreed that when the 180-day exclusivity finally arose, it
would not introduce an authorized generic version. It was, essentially, a
promise not to compete.130
This “generic monopoly,” as the court describes it, can be worth hun-
dreds of millions dollars more than a generic market featuring both the first-
filing generic and the authorized generic.131 As the court noted, authorized
generics may cut first-filer revenues by “40 to 52 percent” during the 180
days of exclusivity.132
In short, Generation 2.0 has featured lucrative side deals between the
brand-name drug company and the generic. These allowed the companies to
camouflage the nature of the transfer by arguing that no “pay” had been
received for the “delay” and that the agreements were simply a settlement of
litigation expectations and risk.
V. “G ENERATION 3.0”: PAY-FOR-DELAY REPLACED BY ACTIVE
OBSTRUCTION OF GENERICS
A. General Description and the Economics at Play
Actavis and Cipro combined to presumptively deliver a knockout punch
to rudimentary cash pay-for-delay deals. In the same vein, King Drug landed
a major post-Actavis blow to “Generation 2.0” deals, where the trail of the
large, unexpected payments is hidden behind multiple settlements combining
layers of superfluous deals with valuable contract clauses. With their ability
to enter into pay-for-delay deals severely diminished, brand-name drug com-
panies are turning to new strategies that actively obstruct generics from en-
tering the market. The point of obstruction can come at different stages of
that [these aspects] . . . were outweighed by the anticompetitive harm of the no-AG agree-
ment.” Id. at 410.
129 Id. at 405.
130 Id. at 406–07, 406 n.27.
131 Id. at 405.
132 Id. at 404 n.21 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 119, at iii). The Court used the R
term “generic duopoly” to describe when the brand-name drug company and the first generic
are both in the market with generic versions. It should be noted, however, that this market
structure is different from what economists generally refer to as a duopoly, which occurs when
the original drug maker is selling its own branded drug and the first generic is selling a generic
version. In contrast, the court’s “generic duopoly” market may feature three versions of the
drug on the market—the brand-name drug and two generic versions—one made by the origi-
nal drug maker and one made by the first filing generic.
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generic development: before an ANDA is submitted, during the ANDA ap-
proval process, after a generic drug has been approved for marketing, or
even once the generic has managed to enter the market.
As this Part will explain, the mechanisms of obstruction are varied and
complex, but most use strategic behavior in the generic substitution system
or in FDA regulatory processes to attempt a delay. In cases of what is known
as “product hopping,” for example, the brand-name drug company takes
advantage of its market power to shift pharmacists, doctors, and consumers
to new versions of drugs before a generic for the “old” version is able to
reach the market.133 A second mechanism uses FDA guidelines meant to en-
sure the safe use of potentially dangerous or potent drugs to prevent poten-
tial generic manufacturers from accessing drug samples necessary to test for
bioequivalence. A third uses a process available to the public to raise con-
cerns about pharmaceuticals in order to bring about a FDA review of the
petition during which ANDA approval will be delayed—knowing full well
that the FDA is likely to take months (or longer) to review even entirely
groundless claims.
The new obstruction strategies may result in anywhere from a few
months up to a couple years of delay, in contrast to the multiple years of
delay that reverse payment agreements can create.134 Obstruction strategies
also are unlikely to be successful beyond the months of delay garnered by
filing an FDA petition or refusing to deal drug samples. Many of the at-
tempts are likely to be rejected by the FDA. Nevertheless, even a rejected or
dismissed attempt at obstruction can be worth hundreds of millions of dol-
lars. Pay-for-delay can be extremely valuable—if a branded drug has $1 bil-
lion in annual U.S. sales, an agreement with the generic to delay entry for
three to four years is worth billions to the brand-name company—even when
factoring in the cost of paying of the generic to delay.135 If those settlements
are not available, however, any form of delay is valuable if the costs and
risks are low.
Consider the example of a citizen petition asking the FDA to delay
approval for a generic.136 The cost of filing a citizen petition is trivial com-
133 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.5 (1st ed. 2002) (discussing
“product hopping”).
134 There are, of course, exceptions and edge cases where “Generation 3.0” strategies
have been successful in achieving several years of generic entry delay. Product hopping, in
particular, has been an effective mechanism for longer-term delay.
135 See Part III for more discussion about the economics behind pay-for-delay. Further, the
estimate above of the value of pay-for-delay is not unreasonable. Of the top 100 drugs in the
United States by revenue in 2013, the median drug had sales over $1 billion. U.S. Pharmaceu-
tical Sales-2013, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/stats/top100/2013/sales [https://perma
.cc/3Q4Z-TVZT] (last updated Feb. 2014) (reporting sales data for Lovaza and Gilenya, the
50th and 51st best-selling drugs, respectively). If the brand-name manufacturer is able to bro-
ker a delay of three years for $500 million, the branded manufacturer gets $2.5 billion out of
the deal, assuming that branded sales are negligible after generic introduction.
136 The details of the citizen petition process will be explained infra at Section V.D.
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pared to the expected value of the benefits, even if success is unlikely.137
Although recent FDA guidance requires that citizen petitions with the poten-
tial to affect generic approval must be considered within 150 days,138 those
approximately five months of delay could be worth hundreds of millions of
dollars in additional monopoly revenues as the generic sits on the sideline
waiting for approval.139 It is not billions, but it will do. In short, the new
strategies might impact a shorter term with lower rewards, but their minimal
cost makes them worth a try when some not entirely baseless claim or objec-
tion can be produced.140
In addition, some of these strategies could conceivably approach the
high-flying numbers of pay-for-delay settlements. Take the example of In re
Flonase Antitrust Litigation.141 At its peak, Flonase, a steroid nasal spray for
allergy treatment, reached $1.3 billion a year in sales.142 Through a compli-
cated series of citizen petitions, GlaxoSmithKline was able to stave off ge-
neric entry for twenty-three months.143 Thus, the delay achieved through
citizen petitions was worth approximately $2.5 billion, assuming it main-
tained the peak $1.3 billion in sales per year. In two class action lawsuits
that were later filed against Glaxo, the company settled for a total of
137 See Darren S. Tucker, FDA Citizen Petition: A New Means of Delaying Generic En-
try?, 20 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON. 10, 11 (2006) (citing Comment of the Staff of the
Bureau of Competition & the Office of Policy Planning of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the
Food & Drug Admin. In the Matter of Citizen Petitions; Actions That Can Be Requested by
Petition; Denials, Withdrawals, and Referrals for Other Administrative Action, FDA Docket
No. 99N-2497, at *4, 6–7 (Mar. 2, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-food-and-drug-administration-concerning-citizen-pe-
titions/v000005.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP3K-LVM4]).
138 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETI-
TIONS FOR STAY OF ACTION SUBJECT TO SECTION 505(Q) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND
COSMETIC ACT 3 (Nov. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregu-
latoryinformation/guidances/ucm079353.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEX4-QLLG] (discussing
Section 505(q)(1)(F)).
139 This calculation assumes the same $1 billion in annual sales for a top 100 drug used in
note 135. R
140 Granted, the cost of these strategies could climb much higher than $25,000 as compa-
nies begin to face antitrust litigation for their actions and must expend millions on legal fees
after the fact. Until these cases are regularly ending in settlements worth billions to the plain-
tiffs, however, these “games” are still valuable for brand-name drug companies.
141 In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 951 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (approving direct
purchaser settlement); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 291 F.R.D. 93 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (approving
indirect purchaser settlement). Further, the value of this strategy is higher considering the
possibility that the petition or request of the brand might actually be accepted. For example,
some have found that the FDA granted about twenty percent of the citizen petitions filed by
brands against generics between 2008 and 2010. Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen
Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 276 (2012), http://cardozolawreview
.com/content/34-1/Carrier.34.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8ND-2FGC].
142 Tracy Staton, GSK Reaches $150M Deal in Flonase Antitrust Case, FIERCEPHARMA
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/gsk-reaches-150m-deal-flonase-antitrust-
case/2012-12-20 [https://perma.cc/9QZX-QDD3].
143 See Seth C. Silber, Jonathan Lutinski & Rachel Taylon, Abuse of the FDA Citizen
Petition Process: Ripe for Antitrust Challenge?, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Jan. 2012,
at 26, 33–35, https://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/silber0112.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RJ8-8JQP]
(describing the delay mechanisms used by GSK).
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$185 million.144 Thus, even with the settlement, the delay may have been
worth $2.3 billion.
This Part continues with a discussion of the Generation 3.0 delay strate-
gies that make up the toolbox for a branded pharmaceutical manufacturer,
starting with perhaps the most well-known: product hopping and
evergreening.
B. Product Hopping and Evergreening
Commentators have written for some time on the phenomenon known
as evergreening, in which a company tries to refresh its market monopoly by
making slight modifications to the delivery mechanism, dosage, or other
characteristics to make the drug eligible for additional exclusivity or pat-
ents.145 As described above, Generation 3.0 strategies involve active obstruc-
tion of generic entities, rather than side deals. One of the first Generation 3.0
strategies involves a variant of evergreening called “product hopping.”
The following steps make up a product hop. First, the brand-name drug
company makes a small change to its existing drug, right as its patents or
regulatory exclusivities are about to expire, and introduces the new formula-
tion as an entirely new drug. This new form is generally protected by new
patents corresponding to the minor changes. The move forces a market shift
away from the old drug—just as it is approaching its patent cliff.
The brand-name drug company brings about the market shift in a num-
ber of ways. Notably, the brand-name company usually undertakes a signifi-
cant promotion and advertising campaign to herald the benefits of the “new”
medication and push doctors to write prescriptions for the new drug. This
strategy obstructs generic substitution in different ways, depending on the
nature of the product hop. When the product hop involves a shift to an en-
tirely new drug (e.g. a shift from Prilosec to Nexium in the market for heart-
burn relief and other stomach acid-related conditions, as described below),
convincing doctors to prescribe the new drug prevents generic substitution
simply because there is no generic equivalent.
Alternatively, in the case in which the product hop involves a switch to
a new form of the drug (e.g. a shift from Suboxone tablets to Suboxone film
144 Carolina Bolado, Judge Approves $150M Flonase Antitrust Accord, LAW360 (June 14,
2013, 6:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/450443/judge-approves-150m-flonase-anti-
trust-accord [https://perma. cc/CT2U-B4DP]; Jonathan Randles, Judge Gives Final OK To
$35M GSK Flonase Settlement, LAW360 (June 19, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/451604/judge-gives-final-ok-to-35m-gsk-flonase-settlement [https://perma.cc/VC39-
DRS2].
145 See generally FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 170–77; Carrier, supra note 2; Jessie Cheng, R
Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 1471 (2008); Vikram Iyengar, Should Pharmaceutical Product Hopping Be Subject to
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 663 (2015); Steve D. Shadowen,
Keith B. Leffler & Joseph T. Lukens, Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2009).
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strips, as described below, in Section C), pharmaceutical representatives
often ask physicians to append a note to their prescriptions asking the phar-
macist to “Dispense as Written.”146 This prevents pharmacists from dispens-
ing the generic version of the old form of the drug since the doctor has
specifically requested the new form—a form for which there is no generic
substitute.
Meanwhile, the brand-name company provides a monetary incentive to
drug payors—including insurers, managed care organizations, and pharma-
ceutical benefit managers—to catalyze the product hop.147 The new drug is
often introduced with significant rebates and discounts to insurers, causing
these insurers to prefer the use of the new drug over the old form in the
short-term.148 An insurer may even place the new drug in a preferred position
in its formulary of drugs covered for patients—meaning that the patient co-
pay for the new drug is likely to be lower compared to that of the old form.
Thus, pressure for doctors to prescribe the new drug comes from all sides:
from pharmaceutical reps preaching the benefits of the product hop, from
patients wishing to minimize their co-pay, from insurers who have a short-
term financial incentive to prefer the new drug, and from pharmacists who
recognize the preferential place of the new drug on formularies and ask doc-
tors to change prescriptions to the new drug even when the old form is
prescribed.149
146 See Genentech’s “Preserve Your Branded Choice” website for CellCept (a drug that
prevents organ rejection after transplants), which heavily encourages healthcare professionals
to write “Dispense as Written” on prescriptions so branded CellCept is dispensed. The website
even includes a separate PDF file for all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and
Puerto Rico, with specific information about the “Dispense as Written” guidelines in each
jurisdiction. Preserve Your Branded Choice, CELLCEPT, http://www.cellcept.com/hcp/prescrib-
ing-branded-cellcept [https://perma.cc/ATX8-PEA9].
147 For some further discussion of this issue, see Shadowen, Leffler & Lukens, supra note
145, at 17–21. R
148 Note that these rebates are really only valuable to the insurer when you compare the
price of the brand’s “old drug” to the rebated/discounted price of the new drug. The cheapest
option for the insurer would be to pay for a generic version of the old drug at a price cheaper
than even a discounted version of a patent-protected new formulation. Further, rebates and
discounts are likely to disappear or diminish once the product hop is sufficiently completed.
149 Consumers often receive financial incentives on top of differential co-pays. Many
pharmaceutical companies provide co-pay “coupons” or “rebates” to patients. These incen-
tives discount the patient’s out-of-pocket costs for drugs at the point of sale, perhaps influenc-
ing the patient to purchase expensive drugs while shifting all cost (and risk) onto insurers. The
economic implications of these coupons are an ongoing subject of debate in pharmaceutical
pricing. Massachusetts was the only state to have banned these coupons until its law was
repealed (for drugs without generic equivalents) in 2012, and federal health insurance (e.g.
Medicare, Medicaid, veterans’ benefits) users are ineligible for coupon benefits under anti-
kickback laws. See David Schultz, Drug Coupons: A Good Deal For The Patient, But Not The
Insurer, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://khn.org/news/drug-coupons/ [https://per
ma.cc/D6Y3-SMPC] (noting laws preventing those on federal health insurance from using
coupons and detailing the debate over co-pay rebates); Karen Weintraub, Mass., 50th State,
Now Allows Drug Coupons: What You Need To Know, WBUR (July 16, 2012, 9:40 AM), http:/
/commonhealth.wbur.org/2012/07/drug-coupons-massachusetts [https://perma.cc/3AFV-P8
KT] (covering repeal of Massachusetts’s drug coupon law). As of February 2016, CellCept, the
drug described in note 146, provided a co-pay card to consumers, along with the push for R
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To complete the product hop, brand-name companies will often discon-
tinue the previous version of the drug, closing distribution channels and
sometimes even buying back all remaining inventory of the drug.150 In some
cases, the original drug is eventually removed or excluded from the insur-
ance formularies or national databases used to determine generic equiva-
lence, such as First Databank MedKnowledge, formerly known as (and still
often referred to as) the National Drug Data File.151
When the original branded drug is excluded from formularies, use of an
equivalent generic generally comes to a full halt. Substitution cannot take
place because there is no longer a brand-name drug for the generic on the
market. Even if a doctor were to write a prescription specifically for the
generic instead of the new branded drug, most insurance companies will
consider the generic drug to be a “branded” drug for co-pay and reimburse-
ment purposes since it is the only drug on the market, which shifts more
costs onto the consumer and discourages use of the drug.
In sum, the result is that a generic that was supposed to create competi-
tion for the original brand-name drug can no longer gain a foothold in the
market. In a variant on this strategy, AstraZeneca switched the market from
its original drug Prilosec to Nexium by moving Prilosec from a prescription
medication to an over-the-counter drug,152 and then shifting the prescription
market to a newly patented Nexium. Commentators have argued that Nex-
ium is little different from its predecessor drug.153
The strategy has been enormously successful. Before patent expiration,
Prilosec was the country’s number one selling drug with $6 billion per year
in sales.154 In 2013, twelve years after Nexium launched, Nexium was the
number two selling drug with just under $6 billion in sales, $2.5 billion of
doctors to prescribe the branded medication. CellCept CoPay Card, CELLCEPT, http://www
.cellcept.com/hcp/patient-financial-resources/cellcept-copay-card [https://perma.cc/93H3-S2
CA].
150 See FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 175. In at least one instance, a pharmaceutical com- R
pany “managed to persuade the FDA to withdraw its license” for an original branded drug
right as generic competition was about to be permitted. Lars Noah, Product Hopping 2.0:
Getting the FDA to Yank Your Original License Beats Stacking Patents, 19 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 161, 165 (2015).
151 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 580 F. Supp. 2d 345, 355 (D. Del. 2008)
(featuring the case of TriCor, in which the brand-name manufacturer recoded earlier versions
of TriCor as “obsolete” in the NDDF, allegedly blocking some substitution); see also Carrier,
A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements, supra note 2, at 1019–20 (discussing R
TriCor and the National Drug Data File).
152 You might remember the omnipresent commercials featuring comedian “Larry the
Cable Guy” trumpeting the news that Prilosec was available over-the-counter.
153 See FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 171. Prescription Prilosec was not completely discon- R
tinued, but the move to over-the-counter availability created a product hop because insurers
excluded Prilosec from their formularies once it became available without a prescription.
154 AstraZeneca Holds Off Rivals As Drug Patent Dies, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2001), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/general/2001-10-05-prilosec.htm [https://perma.cc/Y7AC-
5YD6].
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which is paid by the government and its beneficiaries under Medicare Part
D.155
Other recent cases have even more alarming fact patterns. Consider
Asacol, a drug used for the treatment of chronic ulcerative colitis. As the
expiration of the Asacol patents approached and at least two generic compa-
nies planned to enter upon expiration, the brand-name manufacturer under-
took a number of actions to extend its monopoly franchise.156 First, it
developed a higher-dose, extended-release version of the Asacol tablet.157
The new version of Asacol received two new patents, which will both expire
in 2021.158 The company then attempted a product hop before the 2013 expi-
ration of the Asacol patents through a marketing and promotion campaign.
However, the new form of Asacol was only approved for moderately
active ulcerative colitis.159 The older form of Asacol was approved for both
the moderate form and the mild form of the disease.160 Thus, despite contin-
ued efforts to switch all patients to the new form and multiple complaints
alleging that this represented unlawful off-label marketing (because the drug
was not approved for all patients), the new form did not gain substantial
market share.161
The company was not deterred. With Asacol’s patent expiration ap-
proaching, the brand-name firm developed and introduced Delzicol, a
400mg tablet that was bioequivalent to Asacol.162 In fact, as Internet com-
menters discovered, Delzicol was merely an Asacol tablet surrounded by a
cellulose capsule.163 If the capsule was cut open, the original Asacol tablet
fell out.164 Delzicol did not receive a new grant of exclusivity from the FDA
because it was not considered a new molecular entity.165 Nevertheless, the
capsule allowed the company to obtain a patent—despite the fact that the
capsule provides no additional therapeutic benefit.166
155 U.S. Pharmaceutical Sales 2013, supra note 135; Katie Thomas & Robert Pear, Medi- R
care Releases Detailed Data on Prescription Drug Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/business/medicare-releases-detailed-data-on-prescrip-
tion-drug-spending.html [https://perma.cc/XU5Y-VB7P].
156 End-Payor Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint at paras. 115–18, Teamsters Union 25
Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Allergan, PLC, No. 15-cv-12730, 2015 WL 3856331 (D. Mass.
June 22, 2015).
157 Id. at paras. 38–41.
158 Id. at para. 40.
159 Id. at para. 39.
160 Id.
161 Id. at paras. 52–57
162 Id. at paras. 72–75.
163 Id. at paras. 85–88.
164 Id. at paras. 84–87.
165 See Part II above for a discussion of this FDA non-patent exclusivity that provides
marketing protection for new drugs with new active ingredients.
166 Backing this point up is the fact that Delzicol was approved by the FDA as bioe-
quivalent to Asacol, so it could not have been “medically superior” in any way. End-Payor
Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint, supra note 156, at para. 81. Given that the active ingredi- R
ents of Asacol must be released in the gastrointestinal tract to have an effect, Asacol tablets
have always been covered with an enteric coating that prevents the pill from breaking down in
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The company argued that the change was necessary because a slight
modification was also made to an inactive coating ingredient that may have
posed safety concerns.167 According to a complaint, however, this ingredient
remains part of Asacol tablets sold in other countries, and switching out only
this ingredient would not have led to additional exclusivity for Asacol.168
Thus, this switch may have merely been subterfuge to display concern with
safety, when the real reasoning was to add the patentable but inoperable
cellulose capsule and maintain the company’s supra-competitive profits.
Finally, the company went for the hard switch—it completely removed
Asacol from the market, sending all patients to the other form of Asacol or
to Delzicol. In a candid conference call, the company’s CEO left no doubts
about the strategy: “It’s a hard conversion. We’re stopping—we’re going to
stop the shipment of Asacol 400 shortly, and it will be all Delzicol. I think
they’re all familiar with what’s going on.”169 The complaint also alleges the
involvement of reverse payments and citizen petitions, offering an example
of how “multiplicity tactics” are often involved in generic delay.170
Perhaps the most notable recent case in the product-hopping space is
the case that may eventually bring about its downfall. Litigation over a prod-
uct hop involving Namenda, an important Alzheimer’s treatment, reached
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in spring 2015.171 In a May
decision, a three-judge panel denied drug manufacturer Actavis’ appeal of a
preliminary injunction that forced the company to continue selling the old
drug alongside its newer product, Namenda XR.172
The old form of Namenda is a twice-a-day treatment for moderate-to-
severe Alzheimer’s. In July 2013—notably, three years after its approval by
the FDA—Actavis introduced Namenda XR, a higher-dose treatment that
could be taken once daily.173 In August 2014, about one year before patents
would expire on Namenda IR, Actavis tried to completely pull the old form
of the drug from the market. One month later, the New York Attorney Gen-
eral’s office filed a complaint alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman
Act and sought a preliminary injunction to force Actavis to continue selling
the older formulation. The FTC received the requested injunction in Decem-
ber 2014, and the decision was eventually upheld by the Second Circuit.174
highly acidic stomach acid. Yet a complaint alleges that the cellulose capsule in Delzicol easily
and quickly dissolves in stomach acid—thus it has no effect on drug delivery. Id. at paras.
80–82.
167 Id. at paras. 89–103.
168 Id. at para. 83.
169 Id. at para. 108 (citing Warner Chilcott Management Discusses Q4 2012 Results—
Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 22, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://seekingalpha
.com/article/1216961-warner-chilcott-management-discusses-q4-2012-results-earnings-call-
transcript [perma.cc/6A9D-6QJ5]).
170 Id. at paras. 62–64.
171 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
172 Id. at 643.
173 Id. at 647–48.
174 Id. at 649–50.
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Actavis is important, and not just because it was one of the first cases in
which product hopping was found to be potentially anticompetitive. Most
important, the Namenda product hop took place in a market that the com-
pany completely dominated; Namenda is the only treatment in its class avail-
able for Alzheimer’s and the only treatment approved for moderate-to-severe
Alzheimer’s.175 Thus, unlike other cases of product hopping where other
drugs might be available as an inexact substitute, switching to Namenda XR
was the only choice for Alzheimer’s patients who completely depend on the
treatment.176
Further, while the company appeared to be offering the benevolent in-
novation of a once-daily medication, all other Alzheimer’s treatments had
already moved to a once-a-day treatment before the introduction of
Namenda XR.177 The actions raise questions of whether Actavis had waited
to incorporate a known innovation in order to thwart generic entry. Those
allegations are heightened by the fact that Actavis failed to introduce the
once-a-day form for three years after it was approved by the FDA, timed to
less than a year before the patents on original Namenda would expire.178
The development of antagonist strategies such as product hopping has
created the opportunity for brand-name firms to dip back into their pool of
Generation 2.0 tactics. In particular, product hopping has spawned a new set
of “boy scout” clauses, in which the brand-name drug company agrees to
refrain from antagonistic behavior.179 One such clause is an agreement not to
product hop before generic entry, or to handsomely pay the generic if prod-
uct hopping occurs. For example, in In re Opana, class action plaintiffs al-
lege that Endo, a brand-name firm, agreed to pay a first-filing prospective
generic what amounted to over $102 million, but only if sales of the brand-
name drug fell below a certain level in the quarter before the generic launch
date.180 In exchange, the generic delayed its entry for over two years.181 How-
ever, this significant drop in sales would likely occur only if there was a
product hop away from the brand-name drug; thus, the agreement essentially
175 See Current Alzheimer’s Treatments, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, http://www.alz.org/research/
science/alzheimers_disease_treatments.asp [http://perma.cc/E66C-WGLX] (noting that me-
mantine, the drug name for Namenda, is the only NMDA receptor antagonist treatment for
Alzheimer’s and was the only treatment approved for moderate-to-severe Alzheimer’s at the
time of the product hop). A newly introduced drug approved for moderate-to-severe
Alzheimer’s, Namzaric, combines memantine with donepezil, a cholinesterase inhibitor that
had already been approved for Alzheimer’s treatment in the United States in 1996. Id. The
combination drug, however, is also sold by Actavis.
176 Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 654 n.27.
177 Id. at 647; New York v. Actavis PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL 7105198, at *34
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014) (granting preliminary injunction).
178 Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 647–48.
179 See Section IV.C for more discussion of “boy scout” clauses.
180 End-Payors Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at para. 2, In re
Opana ER Antitrust Litig., No. 14 C 10150, 2015 WL 2182959 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2015).
181 Id.
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functioned as a promise to pay the generic in the event Endo decided to
product hop.182
On its face, this agreement appears to actually promote competition by
deterring a brand-name from product hopping before the generic could enter.
The circumstances of the Opana settlement, however, were designed to actu-
ally effectuate Endo’s product hop. Complainants allege that the two compa-
nies knew before entering into the agreement that the brand-name company
would product hop—and in fact, Endo began the FDA approval process for a
new version of the brand-name drug just one month after the agreement.183
Therefore, knowing that a product hop was coming, the $102 million pay-
ment effectively served as a simple reverse payment to the generic in return
for delaying entry until Endo had a chance to complete its product hop.184 By
the time the generic launched, ninety percent of the product’s market had
already switched to the new formulation.185 In sum, Endo’s boy scout clause
was only one part of a strategy in which a product hop triggered a side deal
that essentially served as a reverse payment for delay. Put another way,
Endo’s generous invocation of Scout’s honor was in fact an excuse to use a
new Generation 3.0 strategy to enter into a Generation 2.0 deal masking a
simple Generation 1.0 reverse payment. The weapons may differ—and may
be used simultaneously—but the games remain the same.
C. REMS-based Delay
REMS-based delay is another strategy in the Generation 3.0 obstruction
toolkit. REMS (Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies) are risk manage-
ment and safety plans that the FDA can require a pharmaceutical company to
implement beyond the standard labeling requirements that apply to most
drugs.186 Such plans are developed by the pharmaceutical company and then
approved and continuously reviewed by the FDA.187
182 Id. at paras. 3, 143–52.
183 Id. at para. 3.
184 Id. at para. 149.
185 Id. at para. 158. The generic also secured a no-AG agreement with regards to Opana
ER as well as other side deal considerations, allowing it to recover some of the profits it lost
by allowing a product hop. In the absence of the settlement, the generic may have faced com-
petition from an Endo authorized generic when it launched. Instead, it was able to launch as
the sole generic product although it faced a market that had shifted to a new version of Opana.
The no-AG agreement also helped to make the deal worthwhile for the generic even in the case
where Endo failed to product hop and did not trigger the $102 million payment. Id. at paras.
156–57.
186 REMS, which stands for “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies,” is a system
introduced by the FDA in 2007 as part of amendments to the FDA Act in 2007. U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., FDA BASICS WEBINAR: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGA-
TION STRATEGIES (REMS) 2 (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
Transparency/Basics/UCM328784.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6F5-2ZC2] (presenting risk evalua-
tion and mitigation strategies).
187 Id.
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REMS are unique to a particular drug, but they can include the follow-
ing elements: additional medication inserts to be included with the drug, a
campaign or “communication plan” to inform key stakeholders about the
risks of the drug, and, most notably, “Elements to Assure Safe Use”
(“ETASU”).188 ETASU are the most restrictive requirement of a REMS pro-
gram because they directly influence how and when the drug can be used.
ETASU can include elements such as patient monitoring or testing while
taking the drug, special certification for prescribers or pharmacies, or limita-
tions on how and where the drug can be dispensed (e.g. only in a hospital or
certified infusion site).189 REMS can be modified or completely withdrawn
after further assessment.190
The number of new requirements that REMS can impose on the sale,
distribution, or marketing of a drug have made it ripe for abuse by branded
drug manufacturers looking to keep generics out of the market. For example,
a common ETASU restricts sales of a particular medication to hospitals and
specially certified pharmacies. This creates an obstacle for would-be generic
manufacturers looking for generic approval. The generic must prove that it is
bioequivalent to the brand-name drug,191 and testing for bioequivalence re-
quires that the generic applicant use the brand-name drug as a comparison to
the generic formulation.192 Therein lies the problem. A number of cases have
involved complaints that the brand-name drug company refused to sell a
small amount of their drug to the generic on the grounds that the FDA limits
the drug’s distribution to specific outlets, and the generic company is not one
of those outlets. As described below, the brand-name company refuses, even
as the FDA insists that the company is free to sell to the generic hopeful.
Actelion was one of the first cases on this subject when it was filed in
2012.193 The brand-name company refused to provide samples of two drugs
to potential generic companies, which prevented the generic hopefuls from
filing their applications.194 The brand-name company’s position is difficult to
fathom. Congress considered the potential for this type of tactic, and the
legislation establishing REMS includes a provision specifically stating that
an ETASU cannot be used to block or delay approval of a generic.195 Further,
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012).
192 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8) (2012).
193 Actelion Pharm. LTD v. Apotex Inc., No. 12-5743, 2013 WL 5524078 (D.N.J. Sept. 6,
2013); see also Kat Greene, Actelion Settles Row Over Giving Drugs to Generic Makers,
LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/514434/actelion-settles-
row-over-giving-drugs-to-generics-makers [http://perma.cc/9A4R-BESB]. In one other previ-
ous case filed in 2008, Lannett accused Celgene of refusing to provide it samples of Thalomid.
The case ended in a settlement. Verified Complaint for Mandatory Injunctive Relief, Declara-
tory Relief and Money Damages, Lannett Co., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL
1193912 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2008).
194 Actelion Pharm., 2013 WL 5524078, at *1.
195 21 U.S.C. § 355–1(f)(8) (2012).
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the FDA has repeatedly said that brands may sell samples to firms for bioe-
quivalence testing without violating their REMS program, even issuing let-
ters to branded manufacturers specifically permitting them to give samples
to prospective generics.196 The legal arguments in the Actelion case focused
on whether or not there is a duty to deal on the part of the brand-name
company and whether refusal to deal constitutes an antitrust violation.197 Ac-
telion asserted that it has a right to refuse sale even in the absence of the
REMS, while the FTC filed a brief stating that the company’s action may
amount to exclusionary conduct.198 The case ended in a settlement in early
2014.199
In a similar case filed against brand-name drug manufacturer Celgene, a
generic hopeful alleged that it spent five years trying unsuccessfully to get a
sample of Celgene’s Thalomid and another five years trying unsuccessfully
to obtain a sample of Celgene’s Revlimid.200 Although the judge dismissed
some claims in the generic’s complaint, she allowed important antitrust
claims to survive a motion to dismiss, finding that the generic pleaded with
enough detail that Celgene had no “legitimate business reasons” for denying
samples.201
REMS manipulation, in theory, could be particularly dangerous for ge-
neric competition. REMS are not linked to patent protection and can con-
196 See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RISK EVALUA-
TION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY (REMS) PUBLIC MEETING 270–72 (July 28, 2010) (statement
by Jane Axelrad, Associate Director of Policy, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Res.), http://www
.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/NewsEvents/UCM224950.pdf [https://perma.cc/V22K-99B7] (as-
serting that REMS should not be a barrier to acquiring generic samples). In part, these letters
came about after a citizen petition filed in 2009 by Dr. Reddy’s asking the FDA to issue
guidance regarding the use of REMS to block or delay generic entry. It also asked the FDA to
establish a procedure by which the FDA would provide letters on behalf of generic applicants
to explain that the generic will meet the REMS safe use requirements that might be implicated
in bioequivalence testing. See Citizen Petition from Kumar Sekar, Senior Dir., to Div. of
Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. FDA-2009-P-0266-0001, at 10 (June 10,
2009), http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/Dr_Reddys_Laboratories,_Inc_-_Citizen_Petition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95H9-5KXL]. Dr. Reddy’s was attempting to obtain samples of Celgene’s
Revlimid and Thalomid, which are also the subject of another ongoing REMS-based lawsuit.
197 See generally Darren S. Tucker, Gregory F. Wells & Margaret Sheer, REMS: The Next
Pharmaceutical Enforcement Priority?, 28 ANTITRUST 74 (2014).
198 For a detailed analysis of the potential antitrust issues in restricted distribution cases,
see Michael A. Carrier, Nicole L. Levidow & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Antitrust Law to
Challenge Turing’s Daraprim Price Increase, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724604 [https://perma.cc/BAG9-3EKY].
199 Greene, supra note 193; Lance Duroni, Actelion Denied Judgment in Tracleer Antitrust R
Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/481879 [http://perma
.cc/SU7D-S4WV]. Although a settlement may represent a party’s rational calculation of the
strength of its case and the costs of continuing to litigate, it may also represent the strategic
choice to abandon a case or pay off the other side if damaging information might emerge or
dangerous precedents might be set.
200 Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-cv-2094, Transcript of Oral Opinion
at *4–9 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2014) (denying in part and granting in part Celgene’s motion to
dismiss by oral opinion). The case later ended in a settlement.
201 Id. at *17–18; see also Carrier, Levidow & Kesselheim, supra note 198, at *13–14 R
(discussing this case).
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tinue indefinitely, even after the expiration of all exclusivities.202 Thus, if a
company, hiding behind a restrictive REMS, refuses to allow samples to
generic hopefuls, the brand-name company could continue its monopoly past
the end of the patent term. Even if the company is eventually forced to share
samples, as described above, every month of delay is valuable.
Furthermore, a restricted distribution scheme does not even need a
REMS (or an active patent) to be effective in blocking generic competition.
For example, in September 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals and its founder,
Martin Shkreli, became the subject of intense scrutiny after raising the price
of a drug by almost 5,500%.203 Turing had bought the rights to Daraprim
(pyrimethamine), an antimalarial drug also used for treatment of infections
common in HIV-positive patients, for $55 million. The company then imme-
diately raised the price of the drug from $13.50 a tablet to $750 a tablet.204 A
thirty-day course of the drug became $20,000, rather than just $400 before
the increase.
The mere magnitude of the price increase for a potentially life-saving
drug—and one that had already been off-patent for decades—led to immedi-
ate public outrage, causing Shkreli to eventually promise a price reduction.205
Behind the price increase, however, was also a REMS-like tactic meant to
block potential generic competition. When Turing acquired the rights to
Daraprim, it maintained a restricted distribution system originally put in
202 For example, all forms of clozapine, a drug for schizophrenia treatment, are covered by
a REMS that requires blood testing and pharmacy certification, among other restrictions. Ap-
proved Risk and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Clozapine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept.
15, 2015), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfm?event=RemsDetails
.page&REMS=351 [http://perma.cc/27ZK-HVCB]. The original patents on clozapine have
expired and numerous generics are now available on the market. New orally disintegrating
tablets have remaining patent exclusivity, but those patents are on the specific product and not
the “substance” of clozapine. Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.access-
data.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/queryai.cfm [https://perma.cc/NHZ9-4LV6] (search for
“Clozapine” in the active ingredient field).
203 Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-
a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html [http://perma.cc/F26V-JSKR]. The price of the drug was as
low as $1 in 2010, before a series of acquisitions. Id.
204 Id.
205 Andrea Mitchell & Phil Helsel, Drug CEO Will Lower Price of Daraprim After Hike
Sparked Outrage, NBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/drug-
ceo-will-lower-price-daraprim-after-outrage-n431926 [http://perma.cc/9FT4-CBAV]. Further,
in October 2015, Imprimis Pharmaceuticals announced that it would sell 100-count bottles of
pyrimethamine mixed with leucovorin for under $100. As a compounding pharmaceutical
company, the formulations are not FDA approved or subject to generic substitution, but they
can be made available to patients by direct prescription from a physician. See Press Release,
Imprimis Pharm., Imprimis Pharmaceuticals to Make Compounded and Customizable Formu-
lation of Pyrimethamine and Leucovorin Available for Physicians to Prescribe for their Pa-
tients as an Alternative to Daraprim (Oct. 22, 2015), http://imprimispharma.investorroom.com/
2015-10-22-Imprimis-Pharmaceuticals-to-Make-Compounded-and-Customizable-Formula-
tion-of-Pyrimethamine-and-Leucovorin-Available-for-Physicians-to-Prescribe-for-their-Pa-
tients-as-an-Alternative-to-Daraprim [http://perma.cc/3PFG-UA2W].
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place by Impax, the previous owner.206 As discussed earlier in this section,
restricted or controlled distribution is often a requirement of a REMS when a
drug presents special concerns regarding safety, administration, or storage.
Yet Impax (and later, Turing) seems to have instituted a restricted distribu-
tion system for no safety reason whatsoever, making the drug only available
through Walgreen’s Specialty Pharmacy.207 Along with creating access
problems for hospitals,208 the move in part seemed to be designed to make it
difficult for generics to gain access to samples.209
Comments from Turing executives support this implication. In response
to the Daraprim pricing controversy and the potential for generic competi-
tion, Jon Haas, director of patient access at Turing, said the following: “Most
likely I would block that purchase [by a generic]. We spent a lot of money
for this drug. We would like to do our best to avoid generic competition. It’s
inevitable. They seem to figure out a way [to make generics], no matter
what. But I’m certainly not going to make it easier for them.”210 The com-
ments suggest a concerted effort to block generic competition, and a failure
to accept the intent of the Hatch-Waxman’s system for introduction of ge-
neric drugs. In addition, although Turing executives may have spoken more
directly than others, actions in many corners of the pharmaceutical industry
reflect a similar mindset. Turing’s actions, specifically the use of restricted
distribution to block competition, are now under investigation by the New
York attorney general.211 U.S. lawmakers have also called on the FTC to
look into the Turing business model.212
206 Michael Carrier & Aaron Kesselheim, The Daraprim Price Hike And A Role For Anti-
trust, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/21/the-
daraprim-price-hike-and-a-role-for-antitrust/ [http://perma.cc/3Z7V-DQ6C].
207 Id.
208 Letter from Stephen B. Calderwood, President, Infectious Diseases Soc’y of Am., and
Adaora Adimora, Chair, HIV Medicine Ass’n, to Tom Evegan, Head of Managed Markets,
Turing Pharm., and Kevin Bernier, Nat’l Dir. of All. Dev. & Pub. Affairs, Turing Pharm. (Sept.
8, 2015), http://www.hivma.org/uploadedFiles/HIVMA/HomePageContent/PyrimethamineLet
terFINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/F2ZV-XPBK].
209 Carrier, Levidow & Kesselheim, supra note 198. R
210 Ed Silverman, How Martin Shkreli Prevents Generic Versions of His Pricey Pill, STAT
PHARMALOT (Oct. 5, 2015), http://pharmalot.com/how-martin-shkreli-prevents-generic-ver-
sions-of-his-pricey-pill/ [http://perma.cc/U78B-U6YE].
211 Andrew Pollack, New York Attorney General Examining Whether Turing Restricted
Drug Access, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/new-
york-attorney-general-examining-if-turing-restricted-drug-access.html [http://perma.cc/CTF6-
DSNL].
212 Id. In December 2015, Shkreli was arrested on charges of securities fraud based on
actions at previous companies and later resigned as CEO of Turing. Christopher M. Matthews,
Rob Copeland & Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Martin Shkreli, Pharma Executive, Arrested on
Fraud Charges, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/martin-shkreli-ar-
rested-on-fraud-charges-1450359637 [http://perma.cc/WA34-CAFL]; Press Release, Turing
Pharm. AG, Turing Pharmaceuticals AG Announces Appointment of Ron Tilles as Interim
CEO (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.turingpharma.com/media/press-release?headline=turing-
pharmaceuticals-ag-announces-appointment-of-ron-tilles-as-interim-ceo [http://perma.cc/
U6H7-HHHG].
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As Carrier, Levidow, and Kesselheim have detailed, the Daraprim sys-
tem was not the first time a Skhreli-led company implemented a restricted
distribution system.213 Notably, Skhreli’s previous company, Retrophin,
bought the rights to a rare kidney-disorder drug called Thiola. Retrophin
increased the price of the drug 2000% from $1.50 to $30 a pill, but it also
created a still-active closed distribution system known as “Thiola Total
Care.”214 This system requires a patient and the patient’s doctor to fax enroll-
ment forms to Retrophin, which then manages direct shipments not through
an online system but only over the phone.215 Documents that Turing turned
over to Congress in advance of a February 2016 hearing revealed that, inter-
nally, it was known that “[e]xclusivity (closed distribution) creates a barrier
and pricing power.”216
Restricted distribution schemes, whether they involve a REMS or not,
also may be deployed to prevent generic substitution by pharmacists. In an-
other story that captured the public’s attention, federal prosecutors an-
nounced an investigation of Valeant Pharmaceuticals, also pilloried for
acquiring medicines and then substantially increasing prices.217 That accusa-
tion, however, was only the first of a series of allegations that would unfold
against Valeant. Just days later, journalists discovered that Valeant had a
deep relationship with a specialty pharmacy known as Philidor that essen-
tially only filled prescriptions for Valeant’s drugs and dermatology creams.218
This investigation in turn led to the discovery of numerous pharmacies and
subsidiaries covertly linked to Valeant.219
The link between Valeant and specific specialty pharmacies allowed
Valeant to ensure that its drugs were filled instead of generic prescriptions.
Doctors would submit prescriptions for Valeant drugs to a mail-order spe-
213 See Carrier, Levidow & Kesselheim, supra note 198, at *20–21. R
214 Id.
215 Thiola Total Care Hub, THIOLA, http://www.thiola.com/hub [http://perma.cc/2JQ6-
TAA2]. Notably, although it may be a technical error, the enrollment form on the Total Care
Hub website automatically fills in the bubble for “dispense as written.” Patient Enrollment
Form for Thiola Total Care Hub, THIOLA, http://www.thiola.com/assets/pdf/THI010V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6LY-64Q3].
216 See Carrier, Levidow & Kesselheim, supra note 198, at *21 (citing Memorandum from R
Democratic Staff to Democratic Members of the Full H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Re-
form Regarding Documents Obtained by Comm. from Turing Pharm. 3 (Feb. 2, 2016), http://
democrats.oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/
Memo%20on%20Turing%20Documents.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2KH-XSXY]).
217 Jonathan D. Rockoff, Valeant Pharmaceuticals Under Investigation by Federal Prose-
cutors, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/valeant-pharmaceuticals-
under-investigation-by-federal-prosecutors-1444874710?mod=e2tw [http://perma.cc/ZFY9-
D5AL].
218 Roddy Boyd, The King’s Gambit: Valeant’s Big Secret, S. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2015), http://sirf-online.org/2015/10/19/hidden-in-plain-sight-valeants-big-
crazy-sort-of-secret-story/ [http://perma.cc/N34K-B8TQ].
219 Bertrand Marotte, Valeant’s Sales Network: Deciphering a Complex Web of Compa-
nies, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
valeants-sales-network-the-firms-and-chess-terms-tied-to-it/article27009058/ [http://perma.cc/
9D3F-9HJ8].
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cialty pharmacy, the prescription would be sent to the patient, and then the
pharmacy would work with insurance companies to secure reimbursement.220
When the prescription is sent to a specialty pharmacy that only deals with
specific drug brands, however, it is very unlikely that any substitution will
take place to dispense a generic or over-the-counter medicine instead of the
brand-name drug.221 As another company using a similar business model dis-
closed in a regulatory filing, the mail-order prescriptions “are less likely to
be subject to the efforts of traditional pharmacies to switch a physician’s
intended prescription of our products to a generic or over-the-counter
brand.”222 That company, Horizon, reportedly charged $1,500 a month for a
medication called Duexis that simply combined ibuprofen and the active in-
gredient in Pepcid.223
The brunt of the costs of this scheme falls on insurers and not patients,
perhaps intentionally so that patients and doctors do not feel the sticker
shock of high prices. Nevertheless, games like these certainly would not help
lower insurance premiums, nor would they help rationalize national spend-
ing on health care. Moreover, when insurers balked at the high cost of Vale-
ant prescriptions, Philidor and other pharmacies allegedly took drastic action
to secure reimbursement, including modifying prescription codes to make it
appear as if the doctor specifically requested that a prescription be “dis-
pensed as written” with Valeant-branded medication.224 As a result, these
schemes continually blocked generic competitors from participating in the
market for the medication.
Aside from restricted distribution programs, other REMS-based
schemes have appeared as well. Frequently, a REMS program will ask a
drug’s manufacturers to develop a more detailed medication guide or a com-
munication plan to inform doctors and patients about the elevated risks of a
drug. For example, Gilenya (fingolimod), an immunosuppressant that treats
relapses of multiple sclerosis, has a REMS that requires a communication
plan with materials for doctors and patients, as well as an FDA-mandated
pregnancy registry.225
When there are multiple manufacturers of a drug—for example, a brand
and generic—the FDA often requires all parties to develop and agree on the
same REMS program, known simply as a Single Shared REMS program
220 Andrew Pollack, Drug Makers Sidestep Barriers on Pricing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/business/drug-makers-sidestep-barriers-on-pricing
.html?smid=pl-share [http://perma.cc/GV46-F5CN].
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Caroline Chen & Ben Elgin, Philidor Said to Modify Prescriptions to Boost Valeant
Sales, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-29/
philidor-said-to-modify-prescriptions-to-boost-valeant-sales [http://perma.cc/Y4JW-4XKA].
225 See Approved Risk and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Gilenya (fingolimod), U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 14, 2015), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/in-
dex.cfm?event=IndvRemsDetails.page&REMS=22 [http://perma.cc/27ZK-HVCB].
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(“SSRS”).226 In particular, generic entry can be conditioned on FDA ap-
proval of a SSRS. The idea that a brand-name company will be willing to
cooperate in streamlining the approval of a generic seems optimistic at best.
When brand name drug makers are able to delay entry by a refusal to coop-
erate, it is not a surprise that they have taken advantage of it, creating an-
other form of generic delay. The generic cannot get its drug approved until
the brand-name company cooperates, and the brand-name company avoids
cooperating to keep the generic off the market. It could be compared to a
high school group project where one member not only refuses to complete a
fair share of the work but also has an incentive to see the project fail in order
to sabotage the grades of fellow group members.
The most notable case dealing with this strategy is In re Suboxone.227
Suboxone is used for the treatment of addiction to opioids, such as heroin
and oxycodone.228 The drug has saved the lives of many addicts, but with
serious consequences. Suboxone has become a street drug of its own, and it
comes with the risk of severe side effects and withdrawal symptoms.229
Suboxone includes both a semi-synthetic opioid and a drug used to combat
the effects of an opioid overdose (with unpleasant side effects), which is
included for the sole purpose of deterring potential users from injecting the
drug intravenously.230
Suboxone is perhaps the poster child for a drug needing a comprehen-
sive REMS program. Its REMS program includes a medication guide, a
checklist that physicians must follow when prescribing the drug, federal au-
thorizations for prescribers, limits on how much medication can be initially
prescribed, an intensive monitoring program requiring frequent patient re-
turn visits, and monitoring on the part of manufacturers, which can even
include “surveillance” and “street ethnography” to detail patterns of
abuse.231
226 In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64
F. Supp. 3d 665, 675 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2014) (granting dismissal of some counts and in part
denying some counts).
227 Id.
228 SUBOXONE, http://www.suboxone.com [http://perma.cc/PM5B-7ANB].
229 See Deborah Sontag, Addiction Treatment With a Dark Side, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/health/in-demand-in-clinics-and-on-the-street-
bupe-can-be-savior-or-menace.html [http://perma.cc/K6CX-4JRA]; Risk Evaluation and Miti-
gation Strategy for Suboxone, INDIVIOR, http://www.suboxonefilmrems.com [http://perma.cc/
D7AV-H7J7].
230 See Sontag, supra note 229. R
231 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY FOR
SUBOXONE, RECKITT BENCKISER PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., NDA 20-733 (Dec. 2011), http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Suboxone%20sublingual%20tablets_2011-12-
22_REMS%20DOCUMENT.pdf [http://perma.cc/ER4A-TEDR] (approving initial Risk Eval-
uation and Mitigation Strategy); see Sontag, supra note 229; see also Hyman, Phelps & McNa- R
mara PC, Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy Tracker, FDA LAW BLOG (July 23, 2015),
www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/files/REMS_Tracker.xls [https://perma.cc/
7BSE-7GTH] (providing extensive tracking of REMS approvals).
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Suboxone is also a blockbuster with over $1.55 billion in sales in 2012,
linked to an explosion of painkiller and heroin abuse in the United States.232
Thus, with the brand-name company, Reckitt Benckiser, nearing the end of
its exclusivity for Suboxone tablets in 2009 and generic entry looming on
the horizon, the company undertook an extraordinary set of actions to main-
tain a monopoly on the Suboxone franchise.233 Complainants allege tactics
including an anti-competitive product hop, sham citizen petitions, and
REMS abuse.234
Specifically, as exclusivity was about to expire on Suboxone tablets,
complaints allege that Reckitt began to develop a film version of Suboxone
with the intention of product hopping from tablet to film form.235 The timing
was off for the company, however, because the final exclusivities for the
tablet were scheduled to expire about eleven months before the FDA ap-
proved the film version.236 The resulting eleven-month gap could have been
a prime opportunity for a generic to enter and gain market share before the
FDA approved the Suboxone film. To effectuate a product hop, complainants
argue that the brand-name company undertook a massive sales and market-
ing campaign to “promote” the idea that the tablet version of Suboxone
presented safety concerns, which would be alleviated by the Suboxone film
version.237 The campaign claimed that there was a high risk of pediatric over-
dose from a bottle of Suboxone tablets, a risk remedied by the packaging for
the film version because the films are packaged individually.238 Notably,
unit-dose packaged tablets are available in all other markets where Subox-
one is sold, other than in the United States.239 In other words, the problem
232 Sontag, supra note 229. R
233 Suboxone is now sold and distributed by Invidior, a specialty pharmaceutical company
that Reckitt Benckiser spun off from its core business in 2014. Ashley Armstrong, Reckitt
Benckiser to Spin-Off Drug Unit Into New Listing, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/rbdot/11235616/Reckitt-Benckiser-to-spin-off-
drug-unit-into-new-listing.html [http://perma.cc/248G-T3M9].
234 End Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at paras. 3–5, In
re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13-md-02445,
2013 WL 5467390 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2013).
235 Id. at para. 15.
236 In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F.
Supp. 3d 665, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
237 Id.
238 End Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 234, R
at paras. 23–26; see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., NDA 20-733, SUBOXONE RISK EVALU-
ATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY (Dec. 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_
docs/rems/Suboxone%20sublingual%20tablets_2011-12-22_REMS%20DOCUMENT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ER4A-TEDR] (approving initial Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy).
239 End Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 234, R
at paras. 21, 28. Further, it was argued that the film may exacerbate safety concerns regarding
pediatric exposure. Since the film dissolves more quickly than the tablet, it may be difficult to
prevent a child from being exposed to the medication once they put it in their mouth. Also, the
potential for abuse may increase since the film’s dissolvability can make its use more discrete.
In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 674; see also Sontag, supra note 229 (“‘It’s such a thin strip R
they’ll put it in the Holy Bible, let it melt and eat a page right out of the good book,’ said Ken
Mobley, a jailer in Whitley County, Ky.”).
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could have been remedied with the tablets, but the company had not seen fit
to provide that resolution in the U.S. market.
Despite the campaign, the possibility of generic tablet entry continued
to be a problem for Reckitt. Thus, the company sent multiple letters and
applications to the FDA proposing a REMS because of the risks of abuse and
pediatric exposure.240 This request was approved, and the FDA required that
the generic and branded Suboxone share the same REMS.241 Unsurprisingly,
attempts at cooperation between Reckitt and the prospective generics proved
unsuccessful. Eventually, the generics gave up, applying for and receiving a
waiver to create a REMS without the branded drug company—the first time
such a waiver had ever been granted.242
The nine-month period during which generics and the brand name com-
pany could not come to an agreement on a REMS may have been worth
upward of $1 billion in Suboxone sales. This is an enormous sum to result
from a disagreement presumably not over the medication itself, but on how
its use would be monitored and how the risks would be explained to the
public.243
In the resulting lawsuit, the judge in 2014 dismissed the generic com-
pany’s standalone claim that Reckitt’s actions regarding the REMS amounted
to an antitrust violation.244 The saga of Suboxone continues in the next sec-
240 Letter from Judith A. Racoosin, Deputy Dir. for Safety, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Research, to John Song, Manager, NA Regulatory Affairs Operations, at 1 (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2011/020733s007,s008ltr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LR5H-V2UM] (approving Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy).
241 In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 675. This requirement is detailed in 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(i)(1) (2012).
242 In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 675–76; see also Kurt R. Karst, In Case You Missed
It . . . . We Did! Prometheus Takes Action Against FDA Over Generic LOTRONEX Approval
and REMS Waiver, and Then Promptly Drops Case, FDA LAW BLOG (June 24, 2015), http://
www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2015/06/in-case-you-missed-it-we-did-pro-
metheus-takes-action-against-fda-over-generic-lotronex-approval-and-.html [https://perma.cc/
C5ML-XJAC] (noting that the Suboxone REMS waiver was the first granted by the FDA); see
also Prometheus Lab. Inc. v. Burwell, No. 15-cv-00742 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 2015) (D.D.C.
denied motion for temporary restraining order May 21, 2015. Prometheus dropped suit June
11, 2015 where a brand-name company filed suit against the FDA for granting a second REMS
waiver in 2014.). The FDA responded by noting, in part, that the brand-name company
“dragg[ed] its feet for more than three years rather than collaborate with [the generic].” See
Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order And/
Or Preliminary Injunction at 6, Prometheus Lab. Inc. v. Burwell, No. 15-cv-00742 (D.D.C.
May 28, 2015), http://www.fdalawblog.net/LOTRONEX%20-%20Roxane%20TRO-PI%20
Opp.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A6J-AJZ7]. Less than a month later, Prometheus completely
dropped its suit. See Karst, supra.
243 Assuming $1.55 billion in sales of Suboxone in 2012. This assumes that the REMS
delay was the only issue standing in the way of generic approval, which is not a fully unrea-
sonable assumption. As will be discussed below, in Section D, immediately before the generics
applied for a REMS waiver, Reckitt announced a withdrawal of Suboxone tablets from the
market and filed a citizen petition asking for the generic ANDA to not be approved. Immedi-
ately after the citizen petition was dismissed in early 2013, the ANDAs were approved. Thus, it
is possible that generic entry could have been approved immediately after the REMS waiver
was approved had Reckitt not taken further action.
244 In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 688.
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tion, however, with further complaints of anticompetitive behavior.245 In
short, it is clear that although the FDA would like to get “[all the parties] to
play nicely together”246 on the playground, mere talk is unlikely to achieve
this goal when billions are on the line. As the FDA admitted in another
REMS case, the agency simply lacks an effective mechanism to force the
two parties to reach agreement.247
D. Delay via Citizen Petition
Citizen petitions offer another way to create obstacles to generic entry.
Since 1979, the FDA has allowed the public to request that the agency “is-
sue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order or take or refrain from taking
any other form of administrative action.”248 Although the program applies to
all products under the FDA’s jurisdiction, the majority of citizen petitions are
related to pharmaceuticals, rather than food, cosmetics, or medical
devices.249
Many pharmaceutical petitions are relatively benign. A number ask the
FDA to allow a generic to certify to a brand name or reference drug no
longer on the market or to allow approval of a generic that differs slightly250
from the brand-name drug in regards to characteristics such as strength or
dosage form.251
Other petitions, however, are troubling, particularly some of the peti-
tions that assert concerns regarding a generic application or request that the
245 See infra Section V.D.
246 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., supra note 196, at 272 (statement by Jane Ax- R
elrad, Associate Director of Policy, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) (discussing
difficulties of getting parties to work together to set up a joint REMS). At least one bill has
been introduced in Congress tackling the two main forms of REMS abuse—denial of samples
for generic testing, and unwillingness to cooperate on single-shared REMS. The bill would
require brand-name drug companies to provide samples (after FDA approval) to prospective
generics at a nondiscriminatory, commercially reasonable, market-based price. It would also
streamline the process by which ANDA applicants can receive a waiver from the single-shared
REMS process if they are able to demonstrate that negotiations were not successful after 120
days. See Fair Access for Safe and Timely Generics Act of 2015, H.R. 2841, 114th Cong.
(2015).
247 Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Or-
der And/Or Preliminary Injunction, Prometheus Lab. Inc. v. Burwell, No. 15-cv-00742, at 15
(D.D.C. May 28, 2015), http://www.fdalawblog.net/LOTRONEX%20-%20Roxane%20TRO-
PI%20Opp.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ5U-WGZ4].
248 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (1979).
249 Hyman, Phelps & McNamara PC, FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, FDA LAW BLOG (Feb.
29, 2016), www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/files/CPTracker.xls [https://per
ma.cc/J4LD-G88R].
250 These are known as “ANDA suitability petitions.” Kurt R. Karst, FDA Rejects Re-
quests to Initiate Rulemaking for (505)(b)(2) NDA Therapeutic Equivalence Rating Decisions,
FDA LAW BLOG (July 28, 2014), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/
2014/07/fda-rejects-requests-to-initiate-rulemaking-for-505b2-nda-therapeutic-equivalence-
rating-decisions.html [https://perma.cc/T8CR-89QS].
251 See id.
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generic applicant conduct new, time-consuming studies before approval.252
As described previously, even if a petition costs hundreds of thousands of
dollars to file, the investment could pay off. The value of the delay could be
lucrative, even when the petition is quickly rejected.
Suboxone, the case that featured creative product hopping and allega-
tions of REMS abuse, again provides a troubling tale. As described in the
previous section, the generics were forced to get a REMS waiver because
they were unable to get the brand-name company, Reckitt, to cooperate. Im-
mediately prior to the generic REMS waiver request, which would have al-
lowed the generic to move forward if and when approved, Reckitt
announced that it was completely pulling Suboxone tablets from the market
(but did not immediately do so).253 The company cited safety concerns re-
lated to pediatric exposure, and it followed up on the same day with a citizen
petition asking the FDA to refrain from approving any generic application
for Suboxone.254 In its citizen petition, the brand-name company again cited
pediatric exposure issues to demand that medications—such as generic
Suboxone—come with “targeted educational interventions on the risk of pe-
diatric exposure” and unit-dose packaging.255
The FDA has a process that allows an application to move forward for a
generic version of a drug no longer on the market, if the FDA determines
that the drug was not removed for safety reasons.256 The safety move coupled
with the citizen petition may have been intended to block the generic from
utilizing this pathway.
Complainants in In re Suboxone allege that this citizen petition was a
sham merely meant to block generic approval.257 Specifically, the requested
labeling measures for generic Suboxone were never required for the brand-
name Suboxone tablets. In addition, the FDA does not have the ability to
require that a generic filer add labeling not approved for the brand-name
drug.258 Most important, Reckitt continued to sell Suboxone tablets in bulk
and without unit-dose packaging even after it made the petition requesting
these restrictions for the generic version.259
252 Carrier & Wander, supra note 141, at 261. R
253 In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64
F. Supp. 3d 665, 675–76 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
254 Id.; see Citizen Petition from Reckitt Benckiser Pharm., Inc. to Div. of Dockets Mgmt.,
U.S. Food and Drug Admin. (Sept. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Citizen Petition from Reckitt Benck-
iser], https://www.naabt.org/documents/Reckitt_Benckiser_Pharmaceuticals_Inc_
2012_FDA_Citizen_Petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4Z3-BFTA].
255 Id.
256 21 C.F.R. § 314.161 (2015). A generic can file a citizen petition asking for an official
determination of whether the reference drug was “withdrawn for safety or effectiveness rea-
sons.” If it is determined that the drug was not withdrawn for those reasons, the drug will be
relisted for the purposes of ANDA submissions.
257 In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 676.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 676–77.
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The FDA denied the brand-name company’s citizen petition and imme-
diately thereafter granted approval for two generic versions of Suboxone
tablets.260 In its denial of the petition, the FDA noted that the brand-name
company’s “own actions . . . undermine, to some extent, its claims with
respect to the severity of this safety issue.”261 Further, the FDA noted that
the brand-name company’s decision to pull Suboxone from the market so
close to generic competition “cannot be ignored,” explaining in a footnote
that Reckitt got access to private information about the potential timing for
generic applications because the generics volunteered this information in an
attempt to get the company to cooperate in REMS creation.262 The FDA ex-
plicitly said it was not denying the petition for failing to raise a valid scien-
tific or regulatory issue or for purposeful obstruction of a generic
application, preferring to focus on the lack of merits of the petition’s safety
concerns. The Agency, nevertheless, made its opprobrium clear by referring
the company’s conduct to the Federal Trade Commission for review.263 Still,
despite the FDA’s complete rebuttal of all of the brand-name company’s
claims, the citizen petition resulted in five months of delay. Given sales of
approximately $1.5 billion in 2012, the five months of delay was worth over
$600 million in unchallenged sales to the brand-name company.264 That is a
remarkably strong incentive for companies to engage in this type of tactic.
As always, the consumer pays the cost in the form of higher prices.
The FDA and the Federal Trade Commission have long recognized that
the citizen petition process could be subject to abuse, expressing concerns
and proposing modifications as early as 1999.265 Congress attempted to curb
260 Id. at 676.
261 Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Tim Baxter,
Glob. Medical Dir., Reckitt Benckiser Pharm., Inc., No. FDA-2012-P-1028, at 15 (Feb. 22,
2013) [hereinafter FDA Response to Reckitt Benckiser], http://www.regulations.gov/#!docu-
mentDetail;D=FDA-2012-P-1028-0011 [https://perma.cc/3UGE-BQLN]; Letter from Robert
L. West, Deputy Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Janak Jadeja,
Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Actavis Elizabeth LLC (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.accessdata.fda
.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2013/091422Orig1s000ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EZB-F3C3]
(approving generic Suboxone tablets on the same day the citizen petition was denied); Letter
from Robert L. West, Deputy Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to
Candice Edwards, Senior Vice President, Regulatory & Clinical Affairs, Amneal Pharm. (Feb.
22, 2013), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2013/203136Orig1s000ltr
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GE4-VDUE] (approving generic Suboxone tablets on the same day the
citizen petition was denied).
262 FDA Response to Reckitt Benckiser, supra note 261, at 15 & n.53. R
263 FDA Response to Reckitt Benckiser, supra note 261, at 16. FTC proceedings are now R
underway against Reckitt Benckiser. See FTC v. Reckitt Benckiser Pharm., Inc., No. 14-MC-
005, 2014 WL 4792175 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2014) (court proceedings over release of docu-
ments for the FTC’s investigation).
264 Suboxone Sales Data, DRUGS.COM (Feb. 2014), http://www.drugs.com/stats/suboxone
[https://perma.cc/23F5-W3D6]. As with all calculations of the value of delay in this Article,
the assumption is made for ease that, without the delay, generic competition would immedi-
ately drop Reckitt’s revenues on Suboxone to zero.
265 See Darren S. Tucker, FDA Citizen Petition: A New Means of Delaying Generic En-
try?, 20 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON. 10, 11 (2006); Citizen Petitions; Actions That Can
be Requested by Petition; Denials, Withdrawals, and Referrals for Other Administrative Ac-
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such abuse by enacting a new rule in 2007 that when a citizen petition could
delay generic approval, the FDA must take final action on the petition within
150 days, unless the delay is necessary to protect the public health.266 To
further discourage baseless or strategically-timed petitions, filers of citizen
petitions must provide the date when they first became aware of the issues
raised.267 Finally, the FDA also was granted the power to deny a petition at
any time if it believes a petition was “submitted with the primary purpose of
delaying the approval of an application and the petition does not on its face
raise valid scientific or regulatory issues.”268
In the case of Suboxone, however, the regulatory process worked en-
tirely as intended, and the brand-name company’s petition was denied ex-
actly 150 days after the date it was filed. Nevertheless, the petition resulted
in five months of delay and an estimated $600 million of higher priced sales
for the company.269 Thus, even when the bell rings on time as Congress
intended, brand-name companies still can use the process to engage in costly
delays. The various amendments also do not seem to have discouraged the
filing of non-meritorious citizen petitions requesting the delay of a generic.
Between fiscal years 2008 and 2013—the period in which the amendments
have been in place—124 delay petitions were filed and only eight were fully
tion, 64 Fed. Reg. 66822-01 (proposed Nov. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 10)
(withdrawn); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment Letter on Citizen Petition; Actions That Can be
Requested by Petition; Denials, Withdrawals, and Referrals for Other Administrative Action
(Mar. 2, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-
staff-comment-food-and-drug-administration-concerning-citizen-petitions/v000005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8DF-24BF].
266 Codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2012), amended by Improving Regulatory Trans-
parency For New Medical Therapies Act, Pub. L. No. 114-89, 129 Stat. 698 (2015). The dead-
line was originally set as 180 days—the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation
Act (“FDASIA”), passed in 2012, shortened the approval period to 150 days. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(q)(2)(A) (2012) (establishing the 150-day deadline for agency action); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(q)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (establishing the public health exception); see also Kurt R. Karst,
The Coming 505(q) Citizen Petition Cliff and Some Interesting Petition Strategies, FDA LAW
BLOG (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/09/the-
coming-505q-citizen-petition-cliff-and-some-interesting-petition-strategies.html [https://perma
.cc/VQG9-MTD7] (presenting more details about the 2007 and FDASIA changes).
267 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(H)(c) (2012).
268 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2012).
269 See Suboxone Sales Data, supra note 264 (listing Suboxone sales as $1.5 billion in R
2012, or $600 million over five months).
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granted.270 Moreover, the number of citizens petitions requesting delay has
not declined since passage of the amendments.271
The amendment’s most biting provision also has proven difficult to ap-
ply. Recall that the statute allows the FDA to summarily deny petitions, but
only when they are both submitted for the main purpose of delay and raise
no valid scientific or regulatory issues on their face. Proving both of these
requirements concurrently has turned out to be quite difficult. In fact, since
the amendments took effect in fiscal year 2008, the FDA has never applied
the summary denial provision.272
In theory, the wounded would-be generic could file a lawsuit asserting
that the brand-name company engaged in anticompetitive behavior by sub-
mitting a sham citizen’s petition. Such a lawsuit is unlikely to succeed, how-
ever.273 The difficulty flows back to Noerr-Pennington, a line of Supreme
Court cases from the 1960s that establishes a general right to petition the
government without fear of antitrust liability.274 Noerr-Pennington does
carve out an exception that allows antitrust liability when petitioning the
government is a sham meant merely to interfere with a competitor.275 The
Court, however, has set an extremely high standard for demonstrating that a
legal petition is a sham. Specifically, the petition must be objectively base-
less, which requires a showing that no reasonable petitioner can realistically
expect success on the merits, as well as subjectively baseless, which requires
a showing that the petition tries to conceal an attempt to interfere directly
270 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DELAYS IN
APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF
AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 6–7 (2013) [hereinafter FDA SIXTH ANNUAL
REPORT FOR FY 2013], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Office-
ofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ReportsBudgets/UCM423291.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L4EF-2CP3]. Thirty-one of these petitions were denied in part or granted in part. Id. at 6.
However, as Carrier notes, these “mixed decisions” are often a formality and not truly a
partial finding in favor of the petitioner. The requests “granted in part” are often trivial re-
quests for bioequivalence studies that have either already been completed, are in progress, or
would certainly be required by the FDA even in the absence of the citizen petition. Carrier &
Wander, supra note 141, at 266–68. R
271 FDA SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2013, supra note 270, at 5; see generally Carrier R
& Wander, supra note 141. R
272 FDA SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2013, supra note 270, at 7. See generally Seth C. R
Silber, Jonathan Lutinski & Rachel Taylon, Abuse of the FDA Citizen Petition Process: Ripe
for Antitrust Challenge?, 25 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON. 26 (2012).
273 See Silber, Lutinski & Taylor, supra note 272, at 30. R
274 For a detailed description of the development of Noerr-Pennington, see generally
Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment, & Patents: The Fraud Fallacy, 17 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 30 (2015).
275 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–72 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents
Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961); see also Silber, Lutinski &
Taylon, supra note 272, at 30; FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 166; Robin Feldman, Intellectual R
Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 301–05 (2013) (suggesting that there may be
a pathway for proving sham litigation, at least with actions that demonstrate multiplicity).
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with competition through the administrative process.276 This burden on plain-
tiffs is crushing.
Still other pathways exist for abusing the citizen petition process, de-
spite the limitations imposed by the amendments. As the FDA itself has
noted, the 150-day clock applies only when a citizen petition has the power
to delay generic approval.277 If a citizen petition is filed before any generic
application is submitted or before any generic application is ready for ap-
proval under the Hatch-Waxman rules, the 150-day deadline does not ap-
ply.278 Thus, citizen petitions filed before a generic application is ready can
serve as yet another obstacle, perhaps combined with strategies already in
play.
Finally, the 150-day limit applies to consideration of each petition,
rather than providing a 150-day maximum for how long generic approval
can be put on hold. That leaves the door open for what the FDA has called
“serial” petitions, in which multiple petitions are filed about the same drug,
frequently from the same petitioner.279 By filing separate petitions at stag-
gered times on disparate issues, a brand-name company can force the FDA
to spend time responding to each petition, thereby potentially lengthening
the total delay-by-citizen-petition far beyond 150 days.280 Thus, as with
REMS delay, codified congressional condemnations of a practice281 are just
a new rule for which manufacturers must find a work-around. They are
about as effective as admonishing school children to speak politely to each
other on the playground.
276 Professional Real Estate Inv’rs. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61
(1993); see also Silber, Lutinski & Taylon, supra note 272, at 30–31; FELDMAN, supra note 13, R
at 166–67.
277 FDA SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2013, supra note 270, at 6. R
278 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, CITIZEN PETITIONS AIMED AT DELAYING GE-
NERIC COMPETITION REMAIN A CONCERN 1 (2015), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDF-
Search/wsgralert-citizen-petitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA6X-FJ67]; see also FDA SIXTH
ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2013, supra note 270, at 6. R
279 FDA SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2013, supra note 270, at 7. R
280 Id.; WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, supra note 278, at 2. In the FDA’s Fourth R
Annual Report on delays related to citizen petitions for the 2011 fiscal year, it noted the fol-
lowing about serial petitioning: “[F]or example, the agency received its fourth 505(q) petition
relating to the approval of ANDAs for topical ophthalmic products and a third 505(q) petition
related to Doryx (doxycycline). The various submissions raised different scientific issues, re-
quiring serial review of different arguments, rather than one comprehensive review of all perti-
nent arguments.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR
STAY OF AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 6 (2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ReportsBudgets/UCM
369782.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ7V-DEZG].
281 Referring to the REMS statute passed by Congress clarifying that a REMS cannot be
used to block an ANDA and Section 505(q) for citizen petitions.
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E. Preventing the “Skinny Label”: Blocking Section viii Carve-Outs
As Generation 3.0 games advance, an additional tactic relates to what is
known as “the skinny label.” Many patents on pharmaceuticals do not cover
substances and chemical formulas, but particular uses of a drug. Hatch-Wax-
man, however, allows a generic applicant to seek approval for a version that
will cover only uses of the drug not protected by patents or FDA exclusivi-
ties.282 Applicants also can ask permission to omit some of the brand-name
drug’s labeling language from the generic label if that language relates to
uses that are protected.283 These are known as section viii carve-outs or
“skinny labels.” For example, the brand-name company’s patent could be a
“method-of-use” patent, which protects only certain indications of the drug,
with “indication” referring to a reason why the drug is administered (e.g.
“for treatment of Helicobacter infections”).284 This could occur when the
drug’s chemical formula had been patented or used in the past, and the com-
pany could receive only a more limited patent for a new indication of the
medicine. Under these circumstances, the generic could request approval for
uses of the medication other than those protected by the use patent.
Request for a “skinny label” could also apply when the brand-name
drug company has received special FDA exclusivities available for circum-
stances such as use of a drug for orphan categories or new pediatric indica-
tions. A generic could file a request indicating that it does not seek approval
for the protected uses. Similarly, if a brand-name drug is only protected by
non-indicatory patents or FDA exclusivities for reasons such as how the drug
should be administered or its bioavailability under certain conditions, a ge-
neric applicant could state that their drug would not be subject to the pro-
tected labeling.285
Generally, these carve-out requests are approved unless they cause the
generic to be less safe or effective than the brand-name drug for all remain-
ing, non-protected uses.286 Such carve-outs or “skinny labels” can be an ef-
fective way for generics to bypass weak or limited patents that brand-name
companies may add near the end of a drug’s patent term in the hopes of
holding onto its exclusive market position for all uses of a drug.
282 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2012).
283 21 C.F.R. § 314.127 (2015).
284 The example indication of “use for treatment of Helicobacter infections” comes from
the FDA’s listed use code for a method-of-use patent listed for Nexium, the popular acid reflux
medication—although this use refers to using Nexium to treat bacterial infections often associ-
ated with stomach ulcers and cancer. See Patent and Exclusivity Search Results from Orange
Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.cfm?Appl_No
=021153&Product_No=002&table1=OB_Rx [https://perma.cc/TJ9B-HUWL] (last updated
Feb. 2016) (patent no. 8,466,175 at the bottom of the list); U.S. Patent No. 8,466,175 (filed
Nov. 17, 2011). The patent was filed more than ten years after Nexium first received FDA
approval.
285 21 C.F.R. § 314.127 (2015).
286 Id.
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For every action, however, there is an equal and opposite reaction, and
that is certainly the case for carve-outs. Under Hatch-Waxman, when a ge-
neric application requests only section viii carve-outs (but contains no Para-
graph IV certifications), that application does not trigger the artificial act of
patent infringement that allows for litigation and a 30-month stay on ap-
proval. Thus, the generic application should be eligible for immediate ap-
proval.287 Undaunted, brand-name companies file citizen petitions, arguing
that the carve out should be disallowed. These petitions generally argue that
the requested carve-out contains information related to the safety or efficacy
of the drug, and that such information cannot be removed from the label.288
A generic could, indeed, be attempting disingenuously to get around the
Hatch-Waxman litigation process by removing certain uses from the label
knowing that physicians may prescribe the drug for all uses, nonetheless.289
The off-label use of medication is a widespread phenomenon that affects
many aspects of pharmaceutical law.290 Nevertheless, there are clear in-
stances of brand-name companies making small labeling changes or securing
287 Lisa Barons Pensabene & Dennis Gregory (on behalf of Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper, and
Scinto), Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview, PRACTICAL L. CO. 4 (2013), http://www.fitzpa-
trickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/Hatch-Wax-
man%20Act%20Overview%20lpensabene_dgregory.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU8C-ELG8].
There are also scenarios where an ANDA filer uses a Paragraph III or IV certification for some
patents and carves out other patents via a section viii statement.
288 See, e.g., Citizen Petition from Ernest Lengle, Exec. Dir. Regulatory Affairs, Watson
Labs., Inc., to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. FDA-2008-P-0069-
0001, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2008-P-
0069-0001 [https://perma.cc/88J5-W822] (requesting that the FDA refrain from allowing a
carve-out for irinotecan hydrochloride on grounds that it would render the generic less safe or
effective than the listed drug).
289 Brand-name drug companies have expressed concern that carve-outs only remove uses
and indications in name only—once on the market, the generics could be prescribed and used
“off-label” for all uses approved for the brand-name version. See Citizen Petition from Robert
Church & David Fox, Hogan Lovells US LLP on behalf of Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc., to
Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. FDA-2014-P-1649, at 12 (Sept. 30,
2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2014-P-1649-0001 [https://per
ma.cc/8RWM-YQ5N]. However, the FDA has refused to accept this as a rationale for not
approving a carve-out, even in cases where the reference listed drug holder says off-label use
could implicate safe and effective use of the drug. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr.
for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Robert Church & David Fox, Hogan Lovells US LLP, No.
FDA-2014-P-1649, at 13–14 (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D
=FDA-2014-P-1649-0005 [https://perma.cc/L5Q9-A6MY]. The FDA said requiring this type
of “foreseeable use” analysis is “inconsistent with our long-standing policy of not interfering
with the practice of medicine,” and noted that a circuit court already rejected this argument as
a bar to generic approval. See id. at 14 n.27 (citing Sigma-Tau Pharm., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288
F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2002)).
290 For example, pharmaceutical companies have enjoyed considerable success in recent
years in convincing courts that FDA restrictions on truthful statements about off-label uses of
drugs may violate free speech. See generally United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d. 149 (2d Cir.
2012); Amarin Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y.
2015). For a discussion of the widespread off-label uses of drugs, see Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d
at 200–01.
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weak method-of-use patents and then filing citizen petitions to block the
carve-out requests that follow.291
The history of Skelaxin, while complicated, is one of the most demon-
strative in this area, showing how adding one or two method-of-use patents
along with clever labeling can lead to years of delay. Skelaxin, the brand-
name for the well-known muscle relaxant metaxalone, was first approved
back in 1962.292 The drug did not face the threat of generic competition for
over thirty years, even though the initial patent on the active ingredient ex-
pired in 1979.293 The competitive landscape changed, however, in 2001,
when a company filed for approval to market generic Skelaxin.294
With generic competition on the horizon, the brand-name drug com-
pany went to work on extending the monopoly market for the drug. In 2001,
the company conducted a study measuring the bioavailability when Skelaxin
is taken on a full stomach compared to its bioavailability in a fasting state.295
The study showed that the bioavailability of Skelaxin increases when taken
with food—in particular, a “high fat meal.”296 Next, the brand-name com-
pany filed for and received two patents in 2002 on the method of “increasing
the bioavailability of metaxalone” by taking it with food.297 In June 2002,
the FDA approved a labeling amendment for Skelaxin, adding a
291 Brand-name companies also have sought to block carve-outs by modifying the “use
codes” associated with a given patent in the Orange Book. Use codes provide a brief descrip-
tion of what use of the drug is covered by the listed patent, and brand-name companies have
been accused of trying to broaden the scope of use codes to prevent a section viii carve-out.
Like the patents listed in the Orange Book, use code information is not verified by the FDA. In
Caraco v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012), however, the Supreme Court found that
generic manufacturers can file a statutory counterclaim seeking correction of an inaccurate use
code.
292 FDA Approved Drug Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda
.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Label_ApprovalHistory#apphist
[https://perma.cc/5BNH-Q9L6] (enter drug name [Skelaxin] in search bar and click
“submit.”).
293 Consolidated Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 10, United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Union & Midwest Health Benefits Fund v. King Pharm., Inc., No. 12-cv-
00085 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 8, 2012), ECF No. 1, consolidated into Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Anti-
trust Litig., No. 12-md-02343 (E.D. Tenn. June 14, 2012), class certification denied 299 F.R.D.
555 (2014).
294 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPLICATION
NO. ANDA 40-445, APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION AP-
PROVAL 211 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter ANDA 40-455 APPROVAL PACKAGE], http://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/anda/2010/040445Orig1s000.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPJ4-
CE7E] (indicating, in the “Factual Background” of a 2010 Memorandum from Martin Shimer
to the Dep’t of Heath & Human Servs., that ANDA 040445 was submitted on September 5,
2001). Although all relevant patents had expired at the time of filing, the generic did not
receive immediate approval because of chemistry and bioequivalence problems that caused at
least two years of delay before the relevant saga begins. Id.
295 Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, to Applicant, King Pharm.
Inc., at 3 (Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Dear Applicant Letter from Gary J. Buehler], http://www
.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/mar04/031904/04p-0140-cp00001-07-Tab-06-vol1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BH3T-BZJR].
296 Id.
297 U.S. Patent No. 6,407,128 (filed Dec. 3, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,683,102 (filed Mar.
25, 2002).
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“pharmacokinetics” section to the drug’s labeling with information about the
food effect study.298 With two new patents acquired with expiration dates in
2021, the brand-name company seemed primed to hold on to the Skelaxin
market for at least a few additional years.299
Now facing two method-of-use patents blocking generic approval, the
generic company filed a citizen petition with the FDA in January 2003 ask-
ing the agency to restore the previous labeling without the bioavailability
data or at least make a declaration that the old label was not withdrawn for
safety or effectiveness concerns.300 In essence, the generic was asking
whether this labeling information would be eligible for a labeling carve-out.
While not approving the generic company’s citizen petition, the FDA filed a
“Dear Applicant” letter in 2004, confirming that the bioavailability informa-
tion could be carved out of generic labeling.301
This was a novel case for the FDA, because Skelaxin has only one
indication—“relief of discomforts associated with . . . musculoskeletal con-
ditions.”302 Thus, the generic company was not asking to simply carve out a
patent-protected use; it was instead seeking to remove labeling informa-
tion.303 The FDA ruled, nevertheless, that removing the data would not
render generic Skelaxin less safe or effective than the brand-name drug.304 In
rendering its decision, the FDA relied on the fact that the study did not result
in any changes to the dosing instructions or the warnings and precautions in
the label.305 The agency also noted that the brand-name company’s label spe-
cifically states that, “[t]he clinical relevance of these effects is unknown,”
thus implicating no issues of safe use.306 With the “Dear Applicant” letter in
hand, the generic appeared to have a clear path to a successful carve-out.
298 Letter from Lawrence Goldkind, Deputy Dir., Div. of Anti-Inflammatory, Analgesic, &
Ophthalmic Drug Prods., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Linda B. Fischer, Dir. Regulatory
Affairs, Elan Pharm., Inc. (June 20, 2002), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/ap-
pletter/2002/13217s044ltr_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LRG-A2JX] (approving new labeling);
see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED LABEL FOR SKELAXIN (2002), http://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2002/13217s036lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDU9-
6YX6].
299 In 2004, the brand-name drug company complicated matters by withdrawing the
400mg form of Skelaxin and replacing it with a newly-approved 800mg version. While an-
other way in which generic competition was frustrated, it is outside of the scope of this current
discussion (and, as discussed below, eventually became moot in the generic approval
discussion).
300 ANDA 40-455 APPROVAL PACKAGE, supra note 294, at 213 (indicating in row 3 of the R
table in “Factual Background” of a 2010 Memorandum from Martin Shimer to the Dep’t of
Heath & Human Servs. that there was a citizen petition in January 2003 requesting that the
original label of Skelaxin be restored).
301 Dear Applicant Letter from Gary J. Buehler, supra note 295, at 1. R
302 Id. at 1.
303 Id. at 3.
304 Id. at 1–5.
305 Id. at 3.
306 Id. at 3. A footnote appended to this argument in the Dear Applicant letter said that the
brand-name drug company’s argument might have had more merit had the company conducted
clinical trials demonstrating a clinical effect from the differences in bioavailability. Id. at 3 n.3.
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Immediately thereafter, however, the brand-name company submitted
multiple citizen petitions challenging the contents of the FDA’s “Dear Appli-
cant” letter.307 At this point, instead of wading into a new battle over sec-
tion viii carve-outs, the generic applicant filed Paragraph IV certifications
for the two new patents in late 2004, triggering litigation with the brand-
name company.308 While the lawsuit was underway, the brand-name com-
pany worked to strengthen its labeling position, receiving approval for a new
label in 2006 which removed the sentence about unknown clinical relevance
and added the following sentence to the Precautions section of the label:
“Taking SKELAXIN with food may enhance general [central nervous sys-
tem] depression; elderly patients may be especially susceptible to this CNS
effect.”309 Now, the brand-name company had a label with a patent-protected
precaution implicating safe use for a drug with only one indication, posing a
difficult problem for the generic and the FDA. As the FDA admitted,
“[c]arving out patent-protected language from the Precautions section of a
label that pertains to a labeled use would generally not be permitted.”310
The FDA, at an impasse, essentially chose to punt on the issue, making
no decision on the brand-name company’s citizen petitions. Instead, closure
eventually came from the courts five years later, when a Brooklyn-based
district court judge invalidated the two bioavailability patents.311 The judge
held that, given what was already known about the drug, it was obvious that
Skelaxin would be better absorbed if taken with food.312 Thus, the generic
won its Paragraph IV challenge, and the FDA approved the generic applica-
tion in 2010, making the carve-out discussion entirely moot.313
The delay earned by the brand-name company, however, was not a
moot point. From the date that the FDA accepted the first generic application
to the date of approval, the brand-name company’s tactics delayed the entry
of generic Skelaxin for almost a decade, despite the fact that the company
lost. The delay may have been worth as much as $3 billion in sales314—all
307 ANDA 40-455 APPROVAL PACKAGE, supra note 294, at 213; see, e.g., Citizen Petition R
from Peter Mathers, Stacy Ehrlich & Jennifer Davidson, Kleinfeld, Kaplan and Becker, LLP
on behalf of King Pharm., Inc. to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 18,
2004), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/mar04/031904/04p-0140-cp00001-01-
vol1.pdf [http://perma.cc/2DGT-WFXD].
308 ANDA 40-455 APPROVAL PACKAGE, supra note 294, at 212. R
309 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED LABEL FOR SKELAXIN (2006), http://www.ac-
cessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2006/013217s046lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8BQ-
9H8K] (including the new sentence in the precautions section); see also Letter from Bob
Rappaport, Div. of Anesthesia, Analgesia & Rheumatology, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to
Douglas Dewar, Senior Dir., Regulatory Affairs, King Pharm., Inc. (Nov. 4, 2006), http://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2006/013217s046ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RDZ7-PZ59] (noting that the only label change was to the pharmacokinetics information).
310 ANDA 40-455 APPROVAL PACKAGE, supra note 294, at 217. R
311 King Pharm., Inc. et al. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
312 See id.
313 ANDA 40-455 APPROVAL PACKAGE, supra note 294, at 227. R
314 The figure of $3 billion was calculated as follows: First, 2002 sales figures of $238
million and 2009 sales of $476 million for Skelaxin were averaged to produce an estimate of
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over one sentence on a label and two patents claiming the supposedly novel
finding that Skelaxin is better absorbed when taken with food.
VI. CONCLUSION: EARNING A BETTER GRADE FOR HATCH-WAXMAN
Thirty years of the Hatch-Waxman regime have brought an extraordi-
nary revolution in the introduction of generic drugs. The progress, however,
has not been without resistance. As described above, pharmaceutical compa-
nies have engaged in three waves of behaviors to stave off generic competi-
tion as long as possible. The first generation involves paying generic
companies to delay their entry into the market—that is, sharing a portion of
monopoly profits with a generic in exchange for an agreement to delay com-
petition. With antitrust scrutiny of such behaviors on the horizon, pharma-
ceutical companies developed a further generation of behaviors centered on
multiple side deals, in which the companies settle many cases at once or
agree to provide overvalued or undervalued services to each other as a way
to camouflage the value of the transfers occurring in exchange for delayed
entry. Each of these approaches is a clever way to try to obfuscate the nature
of the behavior. Finally, Generation 3.0 games no longer focus on colluding
with generic competitors; instead, the games rely on micro-obstructions
against generic companies. These include using administrative processes,
regulatory schemes with connections to Hatch-Waxman, and drug modifica-
tions to obstruct generics from getting to market. Further, they often com-
bine a number of these tactics to create a multiplicity effect. Micro-
obstructions are devilishly difficult to detect and deter. Of course, Genera-
tions 3.0 and 2.0 can be combined by developing obstructive behaviors and
then promising not to engage in them, using what this article calls boy scout
clauses.
Of all of the approaches, the boy scout clauses are perhaps the most
cynical. Here, a brand-name company engages in collusive behavior to avoid
competition while trying to insulate itself from attack by claiming that it is
behaving honorably. While boy scout clauses may be particularly cynical,
however, all of the Generation 3.0 approaches threaten a new wave of be-
haviors that will be difficult for Congress, the courts, and regulatory agen-
cies to control.
average yearly Skelaxin sales of $357 million. The first full year in which Skelaxin faced a
pending ANDA was 2002, while 2009 was the last full year before generic approval. Then,
$357 million was multiplied by 9, representing approximately 9 years of delay, to reach a total
value of $3.2 billion. Press Release, King Pharm., King Pharmaceuticals Acquires Primary
Care Business Unit from Elan (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1047699/000095014403000944/g80411exv99w1.txt [https://perma.cc/5FYD-7VCG] (noting
2002 sales of $238 million); Press Release, Sandoz, Sandoz Announces Launch of First Ge-
neric Version of Leading Muscle Relaxant Skelaxin (May 20, 2010), http://www.fiercepharma
.com/press-releases/sandoz-announces-launch-first-generic-version-leading-muscle-relaxant-
skelaxin-anda-e [https://perma.cc/P5NC-NBZ6] (noting 2009 sales of $476 million).
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A. Societal Harms
The strategic behaviors in the Hatch-Waxman arena are troubling from
the perspective of the theoretical underpinnings of both patent and antitrust
law. The patent concern traces back to the constitutional provision that
frames all of patent law. From the activities that should be free to all and
reserved to none, the patent system chooses to dedicate to some, for a lim-
ited period of time, the exclusive use of an innovation based on the theory
that this exclusion will redound to the benefit of society.315 The bargain,
however, is not unlimited. When the patent expires, everyone should be free
to engage in those activities, returning to a competitive environment. Hatch-
Waxman is intended to ensure the prompt return to a competitive environ-
ment at the end of the patent term, as well as to create incentives to weed out
weak patent claims that are improperly keeping competitors out of the par-
ticular innovative space. Pharmaceutical company behavior that extends the
period in which the company can hold off competition runs contrary to the
patent bargain.
The behaviors described in this article also raise antitrust concerns, al-
though those concerns are framed at a slightly different angle.316 As a gen-
eral matter in antitrust doctrine, big is not bad; it is what you do with your
size that matters.317 Thus, brand-name companies that have earned a monop-
oly in the market with their blockbuster drugs are targets of antitrust concern
only when they attempt to extend their monopoly improperly by colluding
with competitors or inappropriately suppressing competition. As scholarly
works by this author and others have noted, agreements not to compete and
activities that abuse the regulatory process to block competitors raise anti-
trust concerns.318 Thus, when pharmaceutical company behavior improperly
delays or impedes the entry of generic competition, that behavior runs con-
trary to the open, competitive market environment for which antitrust law
yearns.
The theoretical concerns translate into tangible damage to society as
well. With patents, the legal system chooses to tolerate certain societal losses
for the innovation effects that may result. When brand-name companies ex-
tend their monopoly power beyond the expiration of the patent, however,
there are unanticipated deadweight losses to society in the form of higher
prices. Whether Congress has chosen the optimal parameters for the patent
315 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of [the] useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discov-
eries.”); see also Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
250, 318 (2013).
316 For a discussion of the differing perspectives of patent law and antitrust law regarding
inappropriate behavior by patent holders, see generally Feldman, supra note 67. R
317 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 26
(2012).
318 See, e.g., id. at 26–33; Carrier, Levidow & Kesselheim, supra note 198, at *31; Hemp- R
hill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 53, at 10. R
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system is a separate question. Once those parameters are set, behaviors that
cause additional deadweight losses for society are contrary to the system’s
incentive structure, and the damage to society should not be tolerated.
The Hatch-Waxman manipulations also are damaging to society in the
form of activities that are wasteful for companies and institutions alike.
Hide-and-seek games that the courts, the FDA, the FTC, and the Patent and
Trademark Office are forced to play are wasteful to all. The games are par-
ticularly burdensome on the court system, with pharmaceutical litigation
over generic competition now joining patent troll litigation as a major com-
ponent of new patent lawsuit filings.319 Sadly, given the amount of money at
stake, the behaviors are likely to continue unless the legal system finds a
way to change the incentives or to create sufficient disincentives. This is not
to suggest that progress has been negligible. The shift from simple pay-for-
delay agreements to side deals and then to micro-obstructions reflects the
progress that regulatory agencies have begun to achieve in the courts. In
addition, although micro-obstructions can create a valuable delay in compe-
tition, they are more difficult to achieve and often less lengthy than pay-for-
delay.
Nevertheless, although the form of the behavior may have shifted, the
behavior remains. And although changes such as the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Actavis and various congressional amendments have been important,
by the time the changes are implemented, the market has moved beyond.
The question is, what should come next.
The following discussion explores new directions for the legal system
in its continuing efforts to alleviate the gamesmanship that the Hatch-Wax-
man system has wrought. The discussion is not intended to provide a
blueprint for legislation or a description of specific doctrinal provisions.
Rather, it is an attempt to suggest the contours of how new approaches could
be structured, and to generate discussion of a shift in approach.
B. Systems, Simplification, Sunshine, and Standards-Based Doctrines
In addition to the approaches that have been undertaken so far, manag-
ing the evolution of the Hatch-Waxman games will require a systems ap-
proach. One could use an analogy from the medical field itself.320 Under the
old approach to cancer treatment, physicians would attack a tumor by trying
319 See Jacqueline Bell, Smartphone, Pharma Giants Dominate List of Top IP Targets,
LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/756254/smartphone-pharma-giants-
dominate-list-of-top-ip-targets [https://perma.cc/86LP-PTC6] (noting that the number of new
patent lawsuits filed in 2015 increased by fifteen percent over the prior year and that generic
pharmaceutical companies were frequent targets of those lawsuits, along with technology com-
panies); 2015 Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED PATS. http://unifiedpatents.com/2015-year-end-
report/ [https://perma.cc/2BD7-7V2H] (showing the prevalence of lawsuits filed by non-prac-
ticing entities in 2015).
320 This system theory example is taken from Robin Feldman, Cultural Property and
Human Cells, 21 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 1, 6 (2014).
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to reduce its size or deny substances that seemed to be feeding it. Modern
medical research has suggested, however, that cancer treatment can be far
more effective when using a systems approach. Specifically, tumors seem to
operate in a networked or systems fashion. Cutting off one approach may
simply lead the tumor to develop work-around approaches, and the new ap-
proaches may be even more dangerous and damaging than the original path-
way. Thus, attacking the problem by trying to mitigate it when it emerges
may be as outdated an approach for the patenting and approval of medicines
as it is for treatments in which those medicines will be involved.321
Taking a systems approach may allow us to move away from what one
of the authors has called death by tinkering—a problem endemic throughout
the patent system.322 In this problematic approach, legal actors address diffi-
cult questions by adjusting the doctrines a little here and a little there without
developing a comprehensive logic for the full breadth of the legal area.
Eventually, the entire doctrinal base threatens to collapse under its own
weight.
One can see a classic example of death by tinkering in the Federal Cir-
cuit’s failed attempts to create a workable rule for determining what types of
inventions should qualify as patentable subject matter. For years, the court
clung to its “machine-or-transformation” test, making ever finer distinctions
to try to avoid uncomfortable results. In the end, the test required considera-
ble hand waving, and one had to suspend a certain amount of disbelief to
overlook the logical discrepancies.323 After a series of three cases gently en-
couraging the Federal Circuit to develop a workable test, the Supreme Court
eventually gave up and supplied its own test.324
A similar phenomenon plagues the various doctrines related to whether
the definition of an invention reaches beyond the state of the art at the time
of the invention. Doctrines developed for mechanical inventions, in which
one generally understands all aspects of the technology, have led to uncom-
fortable results for biologic inventions, in which many unknown factors may
321 Cf. Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 255
(2013) (noting that when a comprehensive problem exists, the answer lies in attacking its
roots, in addition to trimming the tendrils as they emerge in various places).
322 See Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2013) (introducing the concept in the context of Federal Circuit attempts to fix
problems in patent doctrines such as patentable subject matter without taking into account the
doctrinal area as a whole).
323 See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27,
32–33 (2014). For a detailed discussion of the problems with the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-
transformation test, see Feldman, supra note 322, at 15–20, 23–25. See also FELDMAN, supra R
note 13, at 113–24 (describing various failed tests the Federal Circuit has tried for patentable R
subject matter).
324 Feldman, Coming of Age, supra note 323, at 7 (describing the final opinion in the R
Supreme Court’s quartet, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), along
with the Justices’ three prior attempts to prompt the Federal Circuit in Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 659 (2010), Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1289 (2012), and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107 (2013)).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-2\HLL202.txt unknown Seq: 60 12-MAY-16 15:03
558 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 53
be at play. For example, when an invention is a doorknob, one generally
understands the various parts and their operation. There are no unexplained
pieces and no hints that the door frame may be integrating with the door in
ways no one has dreamed.325 Such is not the case with biotechnology inven-
tions, however, and in that realm, society grants rights in the face of signifi-
cant unknowns.
Doctrinal rules that fit comfortably with mechanical inventions can lead
to uncomfortable results in life science cases. Struggling with the problem,
different Federal Circuit panels have created doctrinal rules that contradict
each other and point in different theoretical directions.326 The rules reach
what seem to be good results in each case, but at the expense of doctrinal
coherence and the ability to predict the boundaries of patents going forward.
The entire area now threatens to collapse. Doctrines related to defining an
invention for purposes of comparing it to later inventions are clashing
against doctrines related to defining the invention for purposes of comparing
it to earlier inventions. Unless one is happy holding up a piece of fruit and
declaring that looking in one direction, it is an apple, and looking in another
direction, it is an orange, the doctrines are untenable.327
Therefore, the first step in a systems approach would involve focusing
on the extent to which different systems interact in the process. These in-
clude not only the patent approval system, but also the patent litigation sys-
tem,328 FDA approval systems—including the Orange Book, REMS, citizens
petitions, and other FDA processes—and antitrust doctrines as they may ap-
ply to this arena. Effective progress will require working with all of these
systems at the same time, lest adjustments to one area lead to counteraction
in another. With thirty years of Hatch-Waxman experience, it is time to con-
sider a comprehensive overhaul of the system for generic approval, one that
looks more broadly at the interaction of all of the systems.
The second step is to ruthlessly simplify. For those who value complex-
ity, the Hatch-Waxman system is a garden of delights. Complexity breeds
opportunity, however, and, in the case of Hatch-Waxman, the Act’s com-
plexity has spawned opportunities for manipulation. An overhaul of the
Hatch-Waxman system that resulted in equivalent or even greater complex-
ity would serve little purpose, other than as a full employment act for law-
yers. In contrast, a simplified, slimmed-down system would provide fewer
opportunities for clever gamesmanship, as well as absorbing fewer resources
for the system as a whole.
325 The doorknob example is described more fully in Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in
Biospace, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8–12 (2006).
326 For a more extensive discussion of the clash of doctrines described in this paragraph,
see FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 189–208. R
327 See id. at 207.
328 In light of the introduction of more robust forms of post grant review in the 2011
patent reform America Invents Act, a comprehensive approach would also need to consider
how those systems interact with Hatch-Waxman and how they could be used for
gamesmanship.
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From this perspective, the 2009 Biologics Price Competition and Inno-
vation Act (“BPCIA,” also commonly known as the “Biologics Act”) is not
encouraging. The legislation was intended to provide a pathway for swift
approval of biosimilars, or what could be called generic biologic drugs, in
the same way that Hatch-Waxman provided a speedier pathway for ordinary
generic drugs. Biologics are complex cell-derived drugs that include antibo-
dies that fight autoimmune diseases and proteins that boost white blood cell
counts during chemotherapy. The Biologics Act, however, is even more
complex and convoluted than Hatch-Waxman and seems designed on en-
tirely the wrong template.329 It took until September 2015—six years after
the act’s passage—for the first biosimilar to reach the market.330
Simplification is not the instinct of lawyers in general nor of patent
lawyers in particular. Lawyers are trained to see the nuances in any circum-
stance and may wish to keep options open for whatever their clients need.
Moreover, the patent bar has never been accused of an attraction to exorbi-
tant simplicity. Overcoming these instincts, which are deeply imbedded in
the habits of patent stakeholders, will be an essential component of design-
ing a more effective system.
The third step is to let the sun shine in. Both markets and regulators
work best when information is fully available—information that invites
competition where competition is needed and exposes behavior that regula-
tors can challenge. Moreover, in a world of instant communication, informa-
tion plays a powerful role in disciplining behavior. Information in
pharmaceutical deals and pricing is increasingly segmented, however, and
hidden from key players in the industry—whether those players are competi-
tors, regulators, or consumers.
In particular, pharmaceutical pricing is not necessarily drug-specific
anymore. Rather, pharmaceutical benefit managers, known as “PBMs,” ne-
gotiate the prices for the vast majority of commercially insured drug
purchases.331 In other words, PBMs are third-party intermediaries that nego-
tiate drug prices between payers and others. This frequently results in bun-
dled drug pricing, tucked into which may be pricing that reaps supra-
competitive rewards or blocks generic competition. For example, a drug
company could offer attractive discounts on one drug in exchange for pric-
ing or listing practices that block competition where prices are elevated or
competition would be a greater threat.
329 See generally Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing Bi-
osimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (2012) (analyzing and identifying issues with the Biosimilars
Act).
330 See Ben Hirschler & Michael Shields, Novartis Launches First U.S. ‘Biosimilar’ Drug
at 15 Percent Discount, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015, 8:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
novartis-drug-idUSKCN0R30C220150903 [https://perma.cc/78K8-GT37] (reporting on the
release of a biosimilar version of Amgen’s Neupogen).
331 149 Cong. Rec. 15,570 (2003).
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None of this information is available, either to the market or to regula-
tors. The pharmaceutical ecosystem would benefit tremendously from sun-
shine rules that require disclosure of PBM pricing deals and rebates. This is
not to suggest regulation of pricing, but rather to provide the information
that markets and regulators need for efficient functioning.
A fourth step would be to move away from the Supreme Court’s rule of
reason analysis for pharmaceutical deals that involve generics. Despite the
opening that the Supreme Court created in Actavis, the lower courts largely
have been unable or unwilling to walk through it. The burden remains too
great for anyone to bear. Rather, with deals involving generic entry, Con-
gress should place the burden on those making the deals to show that they
are proper.332 The taint of anticompetitive behavior is too strong throughout
these arrangements, and the extent to which these deals undermine Hatch-
Waxman’s intent to introduce generics early and often is too great. One who
creates complexity, and the resultant capacity to hide behind that complex-
ity, should have the burden to demonstrate that the effects are justifiable.
The most important step, however, is to make more liberal use of stan-
dards-based legal doctrines. The Hatch-Waxman system and its various
amendments have tended to focus on precise and particularized legal rules.
Brand-name drug companies are forbidden from receiving more than one
thirty-month stay; the FDA must take final action on a citizen petition in 150
days.
Some fixes have leaned toward the standards approach. For example,
the FDA’s ability to deny a citizen petition at any time if it believes a petition
was “submitted with the primary purpose of delaying the approval of an
application” is an excellent standards-based approach. The amendment
granting that power, however, goes on to require that the “petition does not
on its face raise valid scientific or regulatory issues,”333 a provision that
moves back toward the realm of rule-based approaches.
A classic standards-based approach can be found in the tax code’s step
transaction doctrine. The doctrine allows tax authorities to collapse all the
steps of a transaction together if the authority deems that they are part of an
overall plan by the taxpayer.334 The doctrine is aimed at ensuring that taxpay-
ers may not avoid legal restrictions by taking individual steps or a circuitous
route.335 A more liberal use of this type of standards-based approach could
give courts and regulators the latitude to shut down strategic behavior, as
opposed to playing cat and mouse across the regulatory provisions.
332 At least two bills have recently been introduced that would begin to shift the burden for
some pay-for-delay settlements. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 2019,
114th Cong. (2015); Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2015, S. 2023, 114th Cong.
(2015).
333 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2012).
334 See Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 275, at 310 (describing the R
value of using this type of doctrine in the patent context).
335 Id.
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One should not be overly optimistic. From a political economy perspec-
tive, the pressure on members of Congress to avoid an overhaul of the sys-
tem—let alone a simplified approach that will close off strategic behavior—
will be great. When Congress tried to block Hatch-Waxman strategic behav-
iors in the 2003 amendments to the Act, Congressman Henry Waxman, one
of the original authors of the Act, addressed the pharmaceutical industry:
I call upon the brand-name industry to cease and desist from in-
venting new games, and that they return to the scientific research
that they are good at and that has been their real contribution.336
The Congressman’s comments appear to have been in vain. Nevertheless, a
comprehensive overhaul of Hatch-Waxman, that takes a systems perspec-
tive, focuses on simplification, and includes a healthy dose of standards-
based authority, could go a long way toward bringing these drug wars under
control. After thirty years of experience with Hatch-Waxman, it is time for
the next phase.
336 FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 160 (citing Press Release, Henry A. Waxman, Representa- R
tive Henry A. Waxman on the Delay of Approval of Generic Drugs (Nov. 20, 2001), http://
www.citizen.org/congress/article_redirect.cfm?ID=6496 [https://perma.cc/6VMC-JLQY]).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-2\HLL202.txt unknown Seq: 64 12-MAY-16 15:03
